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Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts
CHARLES

F.

ABERNATHY*

We have long recognized that the resurrection of § 1983 converted the
fourteenth amendment from a shield into a sword by providing a civil action
for vindication of constitutional rights 1 and, to the extent that damages have
gradually become the authorized remedy for§ 1983 violations/ we have easily come to think of such actions as constitutional torts-civil damage remedies for violations of constitutionally defined rights. 3 There is, however, a
subtler and greater reality to what has transpired, for the mere procedural
vehicle of constitutional enforcement has, in retrospect, changed the substance of constitutional law itself. Section 1983 has not merely served as a
vehicle for enforcing constitutional law, it has led to the making of a new
constitutional law as the Court has adjusted constitutional norms to permit
their enforcement under § 1983.
Courts have been slow to recognize this new reality because it appears
inconsistent with the accepted lore about§ 1983, that it has no substance of
its own, creates no rights, and merely enforces those rights already found in
the Constitution.4 That remains true, courts having decisively rejected pro-

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. 1969, J.D. 1973, LL.M. 1975
Harvard University. I wish to thank my research assistants, Kathryn M. Silva and Lauren Van
Wazer, and my colleagues who heard and criticized an earlier version of this paper, for their help in
preparing this article.
1. See Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REv.
277, 322 (1965) (using metaphor of sword and shield).
2. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111-12 (1983) (no equitable relief shall be given
in § 1983 case unless remedies at law are inadequate; damages are adequate remedy even against
widely enforced government policy authorizing police to use chokeholds to subdue· suspects); Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5, 41-67 (1980) (criticizing developing emphasis on
damage remedies under§ 1983 and offering alternative approach that was not cited, but was implicitly rejected in Lyons).
3. For recent examples of the accepted lore of "constitutional torts," see Blum, Applying the
Parratt/Hudson Doctrine, 13 HAsTINGS CoNsr. L.Q. 695 passim (1986) (due process claims under
§ 1983); Eisenberg & Scwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CoRNELL L. REv.
641 passim (1987) (statistical analysis of claims); Levinson, Due Process Challenges to Governmental
Actions: The Meaning of Parratt and Hudson, 18 URB. LAW. 189 passim (1986) (due process
claims under§ 1983); Note, Daniels, Davidson, and the Unleal'ned Lesson of Parratt v. Taylor:
Eliminating Simple Negligence as a Basis for Procedural Due Process Claims (If at First You Don't
Succeed, Overrule It), 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 98 passim (1986) (by L. Yustak) (liability standards); Note, Section 1983 and Due Process Liberties, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 129 passim (1986)
(due process liability); Note, A Theory of Negligence for Constitutional Torts, 92 YALE L.J. 683
passim (1983) (by R. Kania) [hereinafter Note, A Theory of Negligence] (arguing for negligence
standard for supervisory liability); cf. Casto, Government Liability for Constitutional Torts: Proposals to Amend the Federal Tort Claims Act, 49 Tenn. L. Rev. 201 passim (1982) (federal government's liability).
4. See infra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing cases confirming Court's view that
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fessorial suggestions that statutory liability should be tied to the common law
of 1871 or to some notion of evolving federal common law. 5 The constitu·
tional law that is read into § 1983 is, however, not static, and one of the
factors that has affected the development of constitutional law is § 1983 liti·
gation. The primary effect has been the expression of constitutional law in
tort-like phrases, a substantial departure from the structural constitutional
law emphasized by the Warren and Burger Courts. 6
The definition of standards of care for § 1983's constitutional torts, some·
times incompletely labeled as state-of-mind requirements, is the primary area
in which this new development has occurred. 7 The original Supreme Court
decision reinvigorating § 1983, Monroe v. Pape, 8 signaled that this would be
an important topic, but the Monroe Court's perception that mental elements
would be critical in distinguishing civil from criminal violations9 proved in·
sufficiently insightful, for choice of state-of-mind requirements even more
greatly implicates traditional concerns about federalism and the proper rela·
tionship between federal and state courts. 10 The very availability of damage
§ 1983 creates no substantive rights). Section 1983 also enforces some rights found in other federal
statutes. See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 107 S. Ct. 766, 770-74 (1987)
(rights under federal housing act enforceable under "and laws" language of§ 1983 because no evident congressional intent to preclude remedy). This non-constitutional aspect of§ 1983 is not discussed in this Article.
5. See infra note 57 (discussing problems raised by resort to state law). Professors Eisenberg and
Kreimer have previously offered these theses, finding the rationale for looking to common law in
§ 1983's companion statute, § 1988. See Eisenberg, State Law in Federal Civil Rights Cases: The
Proper Scope ofSectlon 1988, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 499, 528 (1980) (section 1988 should be viewed in
its historical context when interpreting congressional intent); Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil
Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Section 1988, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 630 (1985)(federal courts
should establish common law of civil rights actions under§ 1988).
6. See infra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing predominant method of constitutional
adjudication-the balancing of individual rights against state interests as expressed by legislative
intent).
7. See Kirkpatrick, Defining a Constitutional Tort Under Section 1983: The State-of-Mind Requirement, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 45, 53-70 (1977) (discussing various mental elements that might be
read into § 1983); Comment, The Evolution of the State of Mind Requirement of Section 1983, 47
TuL. L. REv. 870, 883-86 (1973) (by R. Landholm) (reviewing three mental elements that could be
adopted). See generally Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J.
5, 13-25 (1974) (discussing connection between § 1983 and tort concepts generally). Professor
Nahmod had by the 1980s become-the foremost advocate of discussing § 1983 in tort terms. SeeS.
NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 124-28,
175-85, 250-58 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing issues by use of tort language). But, in his most recent
work, Nahmod suggests that overuse of tort language demeans the constitutional interests enforced
through § 1983. See Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77
GEO. L.J. 1719, 1720 (1989) (tort rhetoric makes § 1983 less protective of fourteenth amendment
rights and results in more claims being sent to state courts).
8. 365 u.s. 167 (1961).
9. See id. at 187 (distinguishing § 242's criminal provision, which contains an explicit "wilfullness" requirement, from § 1983's civil standard).
10. See Brower v. Inyo County, 109 S. Ct. 1378, 1381 (1989) (distinguishing between concerns
implicated by constitutional law and those implicated by state tort law and using intent requirement
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remedies and intrusive injunctions under§ 1983 heightened these traditional
concerns, 11 and the post-Monroe prospect of wholesale creation of new stateof-mind requirements for § 1983 transformed concern to anxiety, especially
as some courts indicated that the requirements should be developed by incorporating ordinary common-law tort standards into federallaw. 12
The movement for direct incorporation of state tort elements into § 1983
soon came to a halt, not only because of increasing appreciation of the federalism concerns, 13 but also because of basic manageability problems with the
to distance the two concerns from one another). Compare Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700-01
(1976) (federal courts should avoid reading state tort standards into § 1983 so as not to upset
federal system that places states in control of most torts) with The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873) (fourteenth amendment should not be so broadly construed as to inaugurate "[radical) changes [in] the whole theory of the relations of the state and federal governments").
11. Professor Nichol has argued that § 1983 "was designed to afford an extremely intrusive federal remedy." Nichol, Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 13 VA. L. REV. 959, 963 (1987)
(making the argument particularly with respect to state judges, but then suggesting that changed
times make it necessary to depart from strict adherence to the framers' vision). The Supreme Court
has tended to limit§ 1983's intrusiveness. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372-73 (1976) (limiting broad-ranging structural decrees in context of police-misconduct case); Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 678 (1974) (federalism concerns inherent in eleventh amendment prevent use of§ 1983 to
obtain retroactive monetary awards against state treasuries); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54
(1971) ("our federalism" prevents federal court in§ 1983 action from enjoining pending state criminal prosecution). Congress has also adopted some limited legislation that has made it more difficult
for federal courts to intrude. See Civil Rights oflnstitutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)
(1982) (requiring exhaustion of state administrative remedies in some cases). But see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 694 (1978) (Congress meant to make state governments liable for attorneys' fees
in some § 1983 cases). Commentators have also urged restrictions of§ 1983 in the interests of
federalism. See Whitman, supra note 2, at 62-67 (suggesting that Court limit damage recoveries and
accentuate equitable relief, a position rejected by the Court in Lyons); Developments in the LawSection 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1185-88 (1977) (displaying concern that Jaw
made under § 1983 might displace states' roles and examining techniques developed to inhibit such
developments).
12. See infra Part III.A (discussing problem of disembodied state of mind requirements).
13. Increasing concern that the problem Jay in§ 1983 as a statute manifested itself in a variety of
ways: (1) creation of defenses that limit damage relief but not all liability, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466
U.S. 522, 541-44 (1984) (immunity defenses do not bar attorneys fees awards or declaratory and
injunctive relief in§ 1983 cases); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) Gudicial immunity is
available defense to section 1983 claim); (2) narrow construction of ancillary relief, such as attorneys' fees, so that constitutional rights may remain vindicated but the hicentive to use§ 1983 as the
vehicle for vindication will be reduced, see Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 759-60 (1987) (no attorneys' fee award when plaintiff has won favorable ruling of Jaw unless plaintiff also ultimately secures
civil relief); and (3) creation of special interpretations, although sometimes abortive, that try to
make the scope of§ 1983 narrower than constitutional law, compare Polk County v. Dodson, 454
U.S. 312, 317-25 (1981) (public defenders not acting "under color of" Jaw, with strong implication
that statutory language may be narrower than constitutional state-action doctrine) with Tower v.
Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984) (public defender may be sued for conspiring with state officials to
deprive another of federal right) and West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2255 (1988) (statutory "under
color of" Jaw element is coterminous with constitutional state-action doctrine). Yet it is difficult to
make the argument that these concerns have eviscerated the statute or hampered the enforcement of
constitutional law through § 1983. See Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 2308 (1988) (restrictive
state notice-of-claim provision cannot be applied to § 1983 action even when it is brought in state
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concept itself. 14 However, the language of torts continued in use, the Court
explaining that the state-of-mind requirements it was adopting had grown
from constitutional law rather than state tort law, and that the particular
requirement in any given § 1983 case would turn on what right the plaintiff
sought to enforce. 15 Part I of this Article traces this development.
The Court's recognition that it was creating§ 1983's standards from constitutional law came a full twenty-five years after Monroe-and after it already had accreted a sizeable number of cases constructing such mental
elements without the benefit of an e~planatory theory. 16 These cases, moreover, differ strikingly from the predominant constitutional law of the period,
because they concentrate on dispositive individual states-of-mind rather than
strict scrutiny, ends/means tests, and the other structured approaches traditionally associated with modern constitutionallaw.t? Part II of this Article
explains why§ 1983 has affected constitutional lawmaking in this way. The
responsible factors are largely a function of two profound policy choicespersonal liability of officials regardless of the legality of their actions under
state law and the practical need to instruct juries.
Part III discusses a derivative but nevertheless equally important matter,
the problem of discussing state-of-mind requirements alone without specifying full standards of care that designate constitutional duties on which the
state-of-mind elements should focus. These constitutional considerations
must ultimately rein in tort phrases to provide a constitutionally based focus
for the Court's state-of-mind requirements so that juries are not free to make
their own constitutional law.
The impact of these factors on constitutional law has not yet been fully
appreciated by teachers of constitutional law, and few constitutional law
casebooks deal with cases in this area. 18 There are some aspects of older
court); Forrester v. White, 108 S. Ct. 538, 544 (1988) (adopting dissenting position of Judge Posner
in court of appeals; statutory-based absolute immunity for judges restricted to their judicial functions, not applicable to administrative duties); Meyer v. Grant, 108 S. Ct. 1886, 1895 (1988) (first
amendment requires overturning state law that prohibits paying persons who gather signatures for
initiative petition). See generally G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & V. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 756-900 (1986) [hereinafter STONE & SEIDMAN] (noting fundamental rights created
since mid-1960s).
14. See infra note 48 and accompanying text (noting number of potential state law torts with
which one constitutional violation might overlap).
15. See infra Part l.c.2 (discussing Court's decisions in 1986). At least one student author has
seen creative potential in constructing constitutional rather than common-law standards of care for
§ 1983. See Note, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 3, at 687 (arguing that constitutional norms
should, more than under common law, lead to increased findings of municipal liability).
16. See infra note 115 (cataloguing such cases).
17. See infra Section II.B.l.a (discussing state of mind requirements and comparing them to
structured constitutional law).
18. The major· exception is Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1987), which applies the intent test to equal protection violations. Jd. at 265.
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unstructured constitutional law that share some of the concerns with individuation that are seen in this area of constitutional law, 19 and therefore it is
difficult to make the claim that this is an entirely new constitutional phenomenon. Nevertheless, the developments in this area have had such an extraordinary impact on the lower federal courts, where constitutional torts
dominate the civil caseload of constitutional cases, that perhaps it is time for
us to consider constitutional torts as more than a procedure for enforcing
constitutional law, and instead as the next step beyond separation of powers
(Constitutional Law I) and structured protection of individual rights (Constitutional Law II)-to consider it Constitutional Law III, the new constitutional standards of care influenced by § 1983.
l.

SECTION

1983

AND THE SEARCH FOR STANDARDS OF CARE

A. MONROE V. PAPE AND THE LEGACY OF "DUAL COVERAGE"

When Chicago police officers in Monroe v. Pape 20 faced a § 1983 complaint that they had broken into a house, ransacked its contents, searched the
family naked, held the father without charge, and subsequently released him
without apology,2 1 they proposed a simple defense: their acts were not done
"under color of" law as required by§ 1983 because they were in violation of
state law. 22 Thus, they argued, the plaintiff's appropriate remedy was to file
a state-law claim in state court. 23 It was the Court's rejection of this Brer
Rabbit defense24 that created the modem § 1983 suit for constitutional
torts. 25
But even here most casebooks place the case in the context of structured review under equal protection. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 698 (11th ed. 1985) (placing intent in context
of high-level scrutiny and using it as transition to affirmative action issues); W. LOCKHART, Y.
KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1288 (5th ed. 1980) (discussing intent in context
of high-level scrutiny given to race); STONE & SEIDMAN, supra note 13, at 553 (indicating that
intentional racial discrimination receives high-level scrutiny but unintended version receives lowlevel scrutiny); cf. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 824, 1504, 1512 (2d ed. 1988)
(repeatedly discussing Arlington Heights in institutional terms-e.g., as disguising a remedies issue
or reflecting "institutional concerns").
19. See infra Part II.B. I.e (discussing "definitional balancing" cases).
20. 365 u.s. 167 (1961).
21. Id. at 169.
22. Id. at 172.
23. /d.; cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
390-91 (1971) (when faced with prospect of constitutional tort action being created against them,
federal officials also argue for reliance upon existing state-law remedies, albeit with removal of the
claims to federal court).
24. See J. HARRIS, How Mr. Rabbit Was Too Sharp for Mr. Fox, in THE COMPLETE TALES OF
UNCLE REMUS 12-14 (1972). Brer Rabbit, like the defendants in Monroe, assured the fox that
throwing him into the briar patch would be a painful punishment, although, of course, it actually
placed Brer Rabbit on his home ground whe~;e he could escape the fox.
25. See Shapo, supra note 1, at 323-24 (inaugurating phrase "constitutional tort" to describe
claims allowed under Monroe). A predecessor decision under the criminal counterpart to § 1983,
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Prior to Monroe, it had been possible to file § 1983 suits in federal court
challenging the constitutionality of state legislation or other official policy, 26
but lower courts had rarely permitted § 1983-based attacks against official
misconduct violating state law. 27 Indeed, a set of judicially created principles
had directed to state court many cases that alleged violations of both state
and federallaw. 28 When Monroe permitted such claims to be brought under
§ 1983,29 it created a "dual-coverage" statute, 30 one that plaintiffs could use
not only to attack the constitutionality of statutes and official policy but also
to attack action by officials that simultaneously violated state statutes or official state policies and the Constitution.
The tort-like aspects that this expansion introduced into§ 1983 were reinforced by another part of the Monroe holding, that part that exempted local
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107-08 (1945) (interpreting present-day § 242 of the criminal
code, which also contains the phrase "under color of" law, to cover state official's action in violation of state law), had led to several lower court decisions favoring the expansion of§ 1983. Shapo,
supra, at 287-94. Monroe, however, constituted the Supreme Court's first modern re-reading of the
statute.
Professor Shapo's article not only provides a first analysis of Monroe, but is also an historical
artifact in its own right. Given his sensitive discussion of the cases and the sense of justice that he
saw behind the decision, one must take his criticism of the developments as a striking indication of
the substantial change that Monroe initiated. See id. at 322 ("it seems questionable that a breach of
[all the criminal provisions of the Bill of Rights] must in all cases call forth the response of this
statutory sword"); id. at 324 ("A cogent argument could be made that the punishment of police
offenses clearly is reserved to the states."); and id. at 326-27 ("fears [of federal intrusion into local
affairs] must count for something," for Monroe developed "a variety of federal common law without
a correspondingly compelling federal interest" (footnotes omitted)). The creator of the phrase
"constitutional tort," it seems, was also its first critic.
26. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (attack by union members on ordinances prohibiting certain public meetings); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (attack by
blacks on Texas' voting statutes prohibiting their participation in Democratic party primary elections); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 380-81 (1915) (attack by blacks against state's statutory
grandfather clause for voting). For a discussion of the general constitutional decisionmaking process prior to Monroe, which was also charaterized by a predominant focus on statutes, see infra text
accompanying notes 171-79 (discussing old structured constitutional law).
27. See Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237, 240 (7th Cir. 1959) (holding that acts in violation of state
law fall outside § 1983). The few decisions that had begun to permit such suits came only after
1945, the year in which the Supreme Court interpreted the criminal law counterpart of§ 1983 to
cover acts done in violation of state law, see supra note 25 (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91 (1945), which interprets§ 1983's criminal counterpart to cover Monroe-type situation), and thus
they were in effect only experimental anticipations of Monroe itself. See Shapo, supra note 1, at 28794 (discussing pre-Monroe § 1983 cases that addressed both physical and economic harms).
28. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941) (abstention doctrine requiring plaintiff to submit unsettled state claims to state courts); Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241
U.S. 440, 455 (1916) (within power of state to require exhaustion of remedies available through
state administrative agencies); Prentis v. Atlantic C.L. Co., 211 U.S. 210, 232 (1908) (requiring
state-court exhaustion in state legislative rulemaking cases).
29. 365 U.S. at 183 ("The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter
need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.").
30. See infra notes 162-66 and accompanying text (discussing dual coverage of§ 1983 as interpreted in Monroe).
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governments from paying the damage judgments that flow from§ 1983 actions.31 Combined with the long-established sovereign immunity doctrine,
which protected state-level governments from monetary liability, 32 Monroe
created a regime in which constitutional enforcement (or restitution) would
depend upon holding individuals responsible. 33 Thus, constitutional adjudication under§ 1983 not only covered officials who acted outside their statelaw authority, it also framed both dual-coverage topics in terms of individual
responsibility. 34
This transformation of§ 1983 into a tort-like statute would later generate
an even more fundamental discussion, phrased in terms straight from the
vocabulary of torts, about the standards of care imposed on state officials by
§ 1983. 35 Monroe had a bit to say about that topic as well, though it is doubtful that the Court understood the full ramifications of its observations.
When Justice Douglas wrote in Monroe that§ 1983 "should be read against
the background of tort liability that makes a [person] responsible for the natural consequences of llis actions," 36 he had a limited agenda in mind. He
intended only to note that § 1983, unlike its criminal-law counterpart, did
not contain a statutory "willfulness" requirement. 37 Even if the remark had
31. 365 U.S. at 187-91, rev'd, Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
32. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 154 (1908) (under eleventh amendment, a federal suit may be
brought against individual officer to enjoin constitutional violation, but not against state itself);
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) (eleventh amendment bars federal suits against a state,
whether brought by its own citizens or citizens of another state); cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 663 (1974) (even when officer may be sued, no monetary relief against state treasury may be
awarded by federal court).
33. The Court would later develop the official immunity doctrine to protect officers from personal liability in some cases. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (recognizing absolute
and qualified immunities, varying with officer's duties); P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 89-99
(1983) (discussing absolute and qualified officer immunity).
34. Even following reversal of the portion of the Monroe holding that exempts local governments
from paying damages for its officials' wrongdoings, see supra note 31, the Court continued to frame
even municipal liability in terms of individual wrongdoing, see City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475
U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (necessary predicate for finding of municipal liability is finding of individual
constitutional violation by officer). But see City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1205-06
(1989) (liability for failure to train; issue discussed in terms of disembodied decision that Court
ascribed to no particular city official).
35. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 698 (1976) (observing that "survivors of an innocent bystander mistakenly shot by a policeman or negligently killed by a sheriff driving a government
vehicle" would not have claim because § 1983's standards are not synonomous with state torts);
Kirkpatrick, supra note 7, at 70 (ultimate liability depends upon state-of-mind issues raised by
defenses as well as constitutional amendment at issue); Kreimer, supra note 5, at 619 (arguing that
federal common law modeled on long-rejected doctrine of Swift v. Tyson should guide § 1983);
Note, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 3 (1983) (arguing that negligence should be standard
governing supervisory liability).
36. 365 U.S. at 187.
37. Justice Douglas' opinion had relied upon precedent interpreting "under color of" law in
§ 1983's criminal counterpart. Id. at 187. Since the unrelated willfulness requirement had dominated discussion in the cited precedent, see Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (sharp
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not led lower courts on a fool's errand, however, courts still would have been
faced with the same important issue after Monroe-what state-of-mind, if
any, would a plaintiff need to prove in order to establish a claim under this
newly discovered constitutional tort?
The issue was not exactly a riew one. Actually, the Court had faced many
occasions in its creation of constitutional law when it discussed the r~levance
of state-of-mind issues. It was usually with respect to motive or intent, and
Justice Douglas must have been aware of the long-running debate about motive in both active and dormant commerce clause cases, 38 as well as in equal
protection and due process litigation. 39 But in those cases the search for
motive, when relevant, was usually for legislative motive. 40 The issue that
was to arise after Monroe was the relevance of the state-of-mind of individual
governmental officials who allegedly had violated their own state's law as
well as the Constitution.
B. THE SEARCH FOR STANDARDS: ABORTIVE EARLY APPROACHES
AND THEIR RELICS

When faced with this new situation, early courts resorted to two quite
different solutions, one for due process cases and the other for equal-protection-based racial discrimination cases. In due process cases, courts sought
refuge in the law that had previously dealt with similar problems of individual responsibility, the law of torts. The most widely emulated decision,
voting split on willfulness issue), Douglas was apparently signaling that persons reading the precedent should not let its unrelated discussion affect their interpretation of§ 1983. See Mo11roe, 365
U.S. at 187 (single paragraph referring to tort background and distinguishing Screws' state-of-mind
requirement appears at end of four-page discussion of Screws' holding regarding "under color of"
law).
38. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 530-31 (1949) (denying license for
"avowed purpose" of closing state market is unconstitutional); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 115 (1941) (rejecting inquiry into congressional motive); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307,
315 (1925) (state regulation violates commerce clause when its "primary purpose .•. is prohibition
of competition"); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922) ("a court must be blind not
to see" Congress' "regulatory affect and purpose"); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276
(1918) ("[w]e have neither the power nor disposition to question the motives of Congress").
39. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elec., 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959) (absent
proof of intent to discriminate racially, literacy test for voting is constitutional); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (under rational basis review for due process and equal
protection, Court will hypothesize state ends) (per Douglas, J.); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469
(1953) (fexas' election process purposely created to accomplish discrimination); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 465-66 (1947) (intentional discrimination in jury selection unconstitutional).
40. The best-known exception, conspicuous by its rarity, is Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
373 (1886) (facially neutral ordinance, administered intentionally to exclude Chinese, is unconstitutional). Since racial discrimination was perfectly constitutional in many areas of public life prior to
1954, see Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (reversing prior Court ruling that
had permitted racial segregation of public schools under "separate but equal" doctrine), it should
not be surprising that there are few cases in the early 20th century that search for racially discriminatory motives.
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Whirl v. Kern, 41 came from the Fifth Circuit and involved a sheriff "accused
of wrongfully overextending to an inmate of his jail the hospitality of his
hostelry and the pleasure of his cuisine."42 Upon being released, the inmate
sued the jailor under § 1983, claiming that he had been deprived of his liberty without due process of law. Faced with a defense argument that these
things happen and no ill will was intended, 43 the court held that the state-ofmind requirement in any given § 1983 case should be determined by analogizing the wrong to its most similar state-law tort:
Under well established principles of tort law, when an essential element of
the wrong itself includes the demonstration of an improper motive, as iii
malicious prosecution, then such principle becomes a part of sec. 1983.
But the origin of such a requirement is in the common law of torts, not in
the [1871] Civil Rights Act. 44

Whirl's incorporation of state tort law standards of care into§ 1983 led it
to hold, on the facts before it, that virtual strict liability applied to such false
imprisonment situations. 45 Other courts adopted the Fifth Circuit's statetort-analogy approach in a number of other situations in which due process
claims were at issue.46 Indeed, the thought process seemed so natural that
virtually to this day courts, attorneys, and law professors often speak of the ·
§ 1983 cases before them as "false arrest," "malicious abuse of process," or
"assault and battery" claims. 47
As natural as it might have seemed, this idea of searching for state tort
analogues was a cracked vase, one internally lit so as to disclose its defect.
Its serious flaw was that it created the risk of forcing§ 1983 into a mold that
completely overlapped with state tort law, rendering it--or the state lawsuperfluous. This would have come about because constitutional principles
at least superficially overlap with a host of state torts. 48 Creation of a federal
41. 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969).
42. /d. at 785.
43. /d. at 786.
44. /d. at 787-88.
45. /d. at 791.
46. See infra notes 67-69 & 77 and accompanying text (discussing cases adopting Whirl v. Kern's
approach in response to § 1983 due process claims).
47. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 7, at 54 (listing possible § 1983 claims by reference to similar
state-law torts); Kreimer, supra note 5, at 618-28 (arguing that use of general federal common law
grown from old common law and supplemented by state law is precisely what Congress wanted for
§ 1983). For a discussion of cases, see infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing§ 1983
cases which refer to state tort law analogues).
48. An illegal search under the fourth amendment might also comprise the state tort of trespass.
See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390. Other possibilities include: an unconstitutional seizure and state-law
battery or wrongful death; an unconstitutional uncompensated taking and state-law claim for inverse condemnation or common law taking; unconstitutional excessive use of force and state-law
battery; procedural due process and state-law libel and contract claims. Cf. Owens v. Okure, 109 S.
Ct. 573, 582 (1989) (when state has specific and general personal injury statutes, the statute of
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tort law that might displace state law had been a constitutional taboo since at
least the time of the Slaughter-House Cases, 49 a taboo reinforced by the diversity-law revolution of the 1930s,5° a taboo reiterated in a related context
when the Supreme Court warned against creating statutory sources of federal
tort law. 51
The internal light disclosing this flaw was evident in Whirl itself. When
the court undertook the process of searching for tort analogues, it first looked
broadly to decisions of courts around the country as well as to traditional
sources of common law. 52 Yet, at the dispositive moment in the case, it
turned to the law of Texas, the state in which the claim arose. 53 If§ 1983
were to adopt state law, was it to be the law of a particular state or the
general common law? Rationales could be finessed to support either approach, but both seemed wildly improbable because of the results they produced. If the forum's law were adopted, federal rights under § 1983 would
change as the state's law changed; 54 if general state common law were
adopted, federal rights would change as the mystic "majority rule" changed,
a perverse form of national lawmaking. 55 These problems could be avoided
by adopting the general common law of 1871, the year of § 1983's adoption,56 but this approach-never considered in Whirl-would have tied
limitations of the residual or general one applies in § 1983 action); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,
276 (1985) (in legal issue in which tort law is applied-statutes of limitation-Court lists possible
analogues and finds list so extensive as to warrant conclusion t)lat all § 1983 claims should be
analogized to generic "personal injury" actions).
49. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,78 (1873) (newly adopted fourteenth amendment should not be read so
as to "radically change" federalism and thereby allow central government to displace states' "ordinary and fundamental" powers).
50. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("[t]here is no federal general common
law," and federal courts' pretense that there was violates Constitution).
51. See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 660-61 (1951) (conspiracy by private persons does
not give rise to claim under § 1985(3); decision dictated by need to avoid constitutional problems
inherent in creating federal torts in such situations).
52. Whirl, 401 F.2d at 791-92 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 2d,
and state cases from Montana to New York).
53. Id. at 791 & n.lO (since Texas law deems warrants '1unctus officio,'' jailor could rely on
nothing to justify his holding of plaintiff and was therefore guilty of false imprisonment rather than
false arrest).
54. Cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985) (statute of limitation for§ 1983 determined
by adoption of law of state in which the federal court sits and thus will vary from state to state).
55. The deference to majority rules seen in the practice of defining appropriate official immunities relies 'upon the common law as it existed at the time of passage of§ 1983, and does not confer
on the states the power of change. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976) (prosecutors
receive absolute immunity under old common law). The sole suggestion that I have found of any
delegation of collective decisionmaking to state common law is the argument that the right to jury
trial "at common law" may have been intended to have a changing meaning over time. See Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 639, 744-45 (1973)
("the term 'common law' in the seventh amendment was probably intended to refer to a process of
legal development, rather than to an immutable and changeless state of the law").
56. Cf. supra note 33 (discussing official immunity doctrine, which uses this approach).
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§ 1983 to hundred-year-old notions, itself an unlikely option. 5 7
To note this illuminated flaw in Whirl's analysis is not to take a pro:-plaintiff or pro-government position, as demonstrated by the cases that followed
the Fifth Circuit's approach. It is true that plaintiffs were helped in the sense
that state tort standards, developed largely with private relationships in
mind, usually omitted the separate consideration of any independent state
interests that might have changed the public policy balance and altered the
state-of-mind element deemed appropriate for the§ 1983 suit. Moreover, to
the extent that the approach simply referred to the law of torts, it focused on
law more easily made by courts because it could be made as common law,
without the constraints that accompanied the interpretation of the Constitution. 58 Yet the incorporation of sta~e law also shortchanged those favoring
federal protection of human rights by simultaneously limiting constitutional
commands under § 1983 to state-law levels and by turning decisionmaking
authority over to the states. 59
In § 1983 cases presenting race-based equal protection claims, courts did
not tum to state law as a source for finding standards of care, probably because in the most active circuit there were no such analogues: states in the
Fifth Circuit virtually required racial discrimination. 60 Therefore, it was not
57. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 517 (1980) (tying § 1983 to old general common law would
cause courts to use "rules of a different era to govern modern problems for which those rules will
only fortuitously supply suitable answers"). Professor Kreimer has argued that the framers of
§ 1983 did in fact intend to adopt the old common law, albeit the Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1
(1842), spurious federal version of that law. Kreimer, supra note 5, at 618-28. Yet even Professor
Kreimer appears to contemplate that this federal common law would have continued to evolve, id.
at 628, probably producing under the heading "common law" what the Court today calls constitutional law. Most damaging to Professor Kreimer's thesis, however, is the Supreme Court's rejection
of the statutory vehicle that would accomplish his result. Although one opinion pre-dating
Kreimer's article suggests that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 requires resort to the general federal common law,
see Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589 n.5 (1978), later cases quite distinctly construe the
statute to require selective adoption of state law, particularly the law of the state in which the
district court sits. See Owens v. Okure, 109 S. Ct. 573, 576 (1989) (section 1988 requires courts to
adopt analogous state statute of limitation of forum); Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 2307 (1988)
(section 1988 normally requires resort to law of forum state); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276
(1985) (section 1983 requires use of forum's statute of limitations); ct Felder, 108 S. Ct. at 2313-14
(this choice-of-law problem should be analogized to Erie, not Swift).
58. See Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1189, 1194-1209 (1987) (discussing techniques of constitutional decisionmaking and their relative importance).
59. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1985) (Tennessee law authorizing shooting of
fleeing felon consistent with common law tradition but nevertheless unconstitutional), and Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940) (breach of peace under common law unconstitutional
under free speech principles), which provide illustrative examples of the distinction between common law and constitutional norms. If common law dictated the content of constitutional torts, then
by definition common law norms could not violate the Constitution or give rise to § 1983 actions.
60. See generally J. PELTASON, FIFrY-EIGHT LONELY MEN (1961) (chronicling experiences of
federal judges who enforced desegregation decrees in southern states).
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so much a matter of logic as one of necessity that forced the circuit court to
an alternate source of law-the Constitution itself. In its en bane decision in
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 61 the court faced a somewhat typical problem of
the post-Brown era: a town had developed and provided municipal services
to its white neighborhoods, but had done virtually nothing for its black
neighborhoods. Local officials, of course, claimed that racism had not motivated their decisions, that the visible divide in the town was the product of
neutral decisionmaking or, at worst, mere inattentiveness. Rather than basing its opinion on readily available language in Monroe, 62 the court turned
directly to constitutional norms, with the following conclusion:
[Actual] intent, motive, or purpose to discriminate [need not be directly
proved,] ... for " 'equal protection of the laws' means more than merely
the absence of governmental action designed to discriminate; ... 'we now
firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and to public interest as the perversity of
a willful scheme.' "63

The cases cited by the Hawkins court were of a similar nature. All involved supposedly neutral decisions in social settings dominated by decades
of entrenched segregation. 64 What is intriguing about these cases is that
none, not even those presenting due process claims, invoked the language of
Monroe. Rather, all developed the applicable law from available constitutional sources, principally the two limited areas in which the Supreme Court
had long rejected the separate-but-equal doctrine, voting and jury service. 65
One other widely respected case from the period, not cited in Hawkins but
relied on by other courts, developed the same principle from a combination
of constitutional materials, chiefly those concerning legislative redistricting. 66
61. 46i F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (en bane), ajf'g 437 F.2d 1286 (1971).
62. See Monroe, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) (Congress intended§ 1983 to provide a remedy when
"by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance, or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced" to protect citizens' rights). This statement, appearing in the middle of a discussion of legislative history that contained lengthy quotations from the legislative debate, contained no citation to
authority. Jd.
·
63. Hawkins, 461 F.2d. at 1172-73 (quoting Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395
F.2d. 920, 931 (2d Cir. 1968)) (emphasis in Hawkins).
64. See id. (citing Norwalk, 395 F.2d at 931) (bfacks displaced under urban renewal program and
suffering long discrimination in private housing market need not prove intent to discriminate; relocation plan having " 'accidental' " impact on blacks violates equal protection); Kennedy Park
Homes Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970) (dictum) ("thoughtlessness rather than a purposeful scheme" to discriminate racially nevertheless violates equal protection
when it imposes severe disadvantage on community long isolated and denied services); United
States ex rel Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53, 65 (5th Cir. 1962) (federal courts in Alabama, where
there exists long history of intentional discrimination against black jurors, discern racial discrimination in juror selection by looking at "objective results" rather than proof of "ill will [or] evil
motive").
65. See supra notes 26 & 39 (citing voting and jury service cases).
66. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967) (District of Columbia's school
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While the Hawkins approach dominated the Fifth Circuit as a consequence of its heavy caseload of racial problems, the state-tort-incorporation
doctrine of Whirl offered the better long-term enticement to courts because it
held out great hope of providing standards for the myriad due process claims
that could arise under § 1983 after Monroe. Some cases were notable because they presented factual situations that the Supreme Court would later
resolve in anothe~ way, using Constitution-based standards. In Madison v.
Manter 67 the First Circuit analogized to the common law in holding that
negligence in seeking a search warrant would not support a claim of constitutional deprivation; rather "Massachusetts common law" required a showing
ofmaliciousness. 68 Aldridge v. Mullins 6 9 involved a police officer in Tennessee who shot a fleeing suspect and sought to excuse his acts as within his
discretion. Citing Tennessee common law, which the court held applicable
under § 1983, the judge ruled that the officer's conduct constituted at least
the "gross negligence" that was actionable under common law. 70
That these and other courts should have focused so single-mindedly on
state law should not have been surprising.. The Supreme Court had seemingly encouraged it with its own use of the approach in three areas that were
integral parts ofthe civil rights territory. First, inP.ierson v. Ray, 71 the Court
found state law pertinent iri the development of the official immunity defens~.
Freedom riders in that case sued police officers and a local Mississippi judge
for falsely charging them with a breach of the peace. In creating an immunity for the defendants, the Court reasoned that the legislative history and
language of§ 1983 gave no "clear indication" that "Congress intended to abrogate immunities long-established in American common law, including one
that provided police officers with a defense of "good faith and probable
cause." 72 The Supreme Court had further reinforced this line of reasoning in
a series of cases that held that drafting deficiencies in civil rights statutes
should be cured by referring to state law. 73 Finally, beginning in the early
system riddled with unconstitutional discrimination). The italicized phrase cited in Hawkins, see
supra text accompanying note 63, is a quotation of a quotation, the trail leading back to Hobson,
even though the Fifth Circuit never cited the case. Judge Skelly Wright supported his views in

Hobson by alluding to Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (legislative apportionment reflecting
no policy fails arbitrariness test of equal protection), and otherwise unnamed "Supreme Court decisions in the last decade." 269 F. Supp. at 497 & n.167.
67. 441 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1971).
68. Id. at 538; see Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144-45 (1979) (similar issue resolved by
reference to Constitution-based norms).
·
69. 377 F. Supp. 850 (M.D. Tenn. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1189 (6th Cir. 1973).
70. I d. at 858; see Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1985) (similar issue resolved by reference
to fourth amendment).
71. 386 u.s. 547 (1967).
72. Id. at 555.
73. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1969) (when statutory remedies
for civil rights violations are deficient, state law for damages may be applied unless inconsistent with
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1970s, the Court created a law of procedural due process that turned to state
law for the very definition of the liberties that would be protected by that
version of the due process clause. 74
The courts in Whirl, Madison, and Aldridge formed a perfectly logical
judgment: if the overall standard of care or mental element applicable to a
given situation is the combination of the state-of-mind that the plaintiff must
prove discounted by any mental elements that would provide a defense; 75 and
if the mental elements relevant to the immunity defense are found by resort
to state tort law; then surely the plaintiff's elements should be found in the
same source-state tort law. Similarly, an experienced judge might have
thought that if the very definition of rights under procedural due process
depends at times on state law, then state law can play a role in ascertaining
the standard of care imposed by constitutional law. 76
Indeed, the reasoning appears to be so logical that courts still find it seductive. Only four years ago, in Conway v. Village of Mount Kisco 17 the Second
Circuit imitated Whirl in a case presenting claims the court characterized as
"in the nature of those for arrest without probable cause, false imprisonment,
malicious prosecution, and conspiracy." 78 The mental elements-in fact all
the elements-of the plaintiff's case were found by referring to state law:
Because there are no federal rules of decision for adjudicating section 1983
actions that are based upon claims of malicious prosecution, we are require~ ... to tum to state law.... In doing so, we find that New York law
permits recovery on a claim of malicious prosecution only where plaintiff
Constitution and laws of United States). The circuit courts had developed an imitative jurisprudence under§ 1983 that used state law to govern statutes of limitations, see Beard v. Stephens, 372
F.2d 685, 688 (5th Cir. 1967) ("We look first to federal law to determine the nature of the claim and
then to state court interpretations of the state's 'statutory catalogue' to see where the claim fits into
the state scheme."), and wrongful-death-like claims, Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 405-06 (5th
Cir. 1961) (state law authorizing survivors to sue adopted in § 1988 suit alleging police beat deceased to death); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985) Oater Supreme Court affirmation of
application of state statute of limitations); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 585, 592 (1978) (same
regarding adoption of state survivorship rules).
74. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972) (plaintiff's due process protections stem from his state property interest in his employment contract and not from any constitutional property rights); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972) ("existence of rules and
understandings, promulgated and fostered by state officials," gives plaintiff opportunity to prove
legitimacy of his claim, proof of which would obligate officials to grant hearing at plaintiff's request); see generally Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1193 (1982).
75. Cf. Kirkpatrick, supra note 7, at 68 (adopting view that final state-of-mind requirement will
be standard of care necessary for plaintiff to prove, subject to "good faith" defense available as of
writing of article).
76. Cf. Dollar v. Haralson County, 704 F.2d 1540, 1544 (11th Cir. 1983) (court's citations indicate influence of procedural due process notions that depend on state law; ultimate decision, however, turns on constitutional norms).
77. 750 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, Cerbone v. Conway, 479 U.S. 84 (1986).
78. Id. at 207.
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has established four elements ... , [including] that the criminal proceeding
was instituted in actual malice. 79

There followeq a two-page discussion of the New York law of malicious
prosecution as applied to Ms. Conway's claim. 80
While few other recent cases are so overt in their adoption of state tort
law, some can be found that see state law as persuasive or at least instructive.
In Dollar v. Haralson County, 81 for example, the court faced the issue of
whether a county that had failed to build a bridge over a creek violated the
constitutional rights of children who were subsequently killed in a car swept
away at a ford in the creek. The issue in the§ 1983 action was whether the
county had a legal duty to construct the bridge. In answering the question
the Eleventh Circuit observed that
[o]ur conclusion in this case is informed, though not controlled, by Georgia
law.... Georgia cases draw a clear line between a discretionary nonfeasance and the negligent maintenance of something erected by the local government in its discretion....
Since the county was under no duty to build the bridge, [the plaintiff's
loss] ... is not compensable under section 1983.82

In an area in which thoughtful law professors, until very recently, pressed
arguments about the necessity of applying common law, 83 one can understand how courts became confused by the Supreme Court's apparently conflicting signals. 84
C. THE SEARCH FOR STANDARDS: THE SUPREME COURT'S
NEW APPROACH

1. The Road to Daniels and Davidson
The Supreme Court expressed dissatisfaction with the Whirl approach as
early as 1976. A short opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist in Paul v.
Davis 85 rejected the contention that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and section 1983 make actionable many wrongs inflicted
by government employees which had heretofore been thought to give rise
79. Id. at 214 (citations and footnote omitted).
80. See id. at 214-15 (discussing New York common law of malicious prosecution).
81. 704 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1983).
82. Id. at 1544.
83. See supra note 57 (citing articles that argue for use of common law).
84. Although the Supreme Court has now decided that§ 1983's standards of care are to be found
by reference to constitutional norms, see infra Part Il.c.2, the Court itself continues occasionally to
· refer uncritically to common law· as dictating the liability rules for§ 1983. See Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 344 n.7 (1986) (dictum) (causation issues under§ 1983 are decided by reference to
common law).
85. 424 u.s. 693 (1976).
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only to state-law tort claims." 86 Justice Marshall's opinion in Estelle v. Gamble, 87 handed down the same year, at least implicitly rejected Whirl. In it the
Court rebuffed a prisoner who claimed an eighth amendment right to be free
from medical malpractice while incarcerated. It concluded that the state law
of negligence was irrelevant to such eighth amendment claims and that only
"deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a cause
of action under section 1983." 88 Baker v. McCollan 89 also appeared to contradict Whirl on very similar facts, holding that a person arrested due to
misidentification had suffered no due process loss. 90
Yet the line to a new position was not a straight one. Parratt v. Taylor 91
rejected a prisoner's claim for constitutional protection for his $23 hobby kit,
but in a most curious fashion. Justice Rehnquist, this time for a virtually
unanimous Court, again stated his theme from Paul of the different sources
of federal constitutional and state common law, and for the first time he
explicitly framed the relevant issue as one related to federal constitutional
law. 92 The Court's remaining statements tended, however, to nullify the
clarity of its initial thrust. The opinion noted that section 1983, as a matter
of statutory construction, "has never been found by this Court to contain a
state-of-mind requirement" 93-an important holding, but one perfectly consistent with WhirL 94 Moreover, in making its constitutional inquiry, the
Court construed the case as presenting a procedural due process claim and
proceeded to craft a rule that reinforced the habit of looking to state-court
causes of action to determine adequacy of remedies. 95 Finally, and almost
without discussion, the Court mentioned the dreaded "N" word, "negligence," holding that negligent deprivations are covered by the right to procedural due process. 96 While astute judges learned to live with Parratt, 97 the
86. ld. at 699.
87. 429 u.s. 97 (1976).
88. Id. at 105.
89. 443 u.s. 137 (1979).
90. I d. at. 143-44. But see Whirl, 407 F.2d at 792 (court allows jailor time to learn his mistake;
no "instant tort"). Baker's overall approach significantly paralleled the position that the Court
would later clarify, that the issue was one of constitutional, not state tort, law. 443 U.S. at 146.
91. 451 u.s. 527 (1981).
92. ld. at 534-35.
93. ld. at 534.
94. See supra text accompanying note 44 (Whirl found no single standard for § 1983; supplied
content by analogy to state tort law).
95. 451 U.S. at 543-44; see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977) (progenitor of Parrott).
This doubly focuses procedural due process on state law, since the identification of protected liberty
and property rights also turns on state law. See supra note 74 (citing cases looking to state law for
liberty and property interests); see also Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 46667 (1981) (state law creates no liberty interest for prisoner; decided same term as Parrott).
96. Parrott, 451 U.S. at 436-37.
97. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499-1500 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (Parrott's concern with adequacy of state remedy relates to procedural due process claims, not substan-
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prior confusion became chaos for many others. 98

2. Daniels, Cannon, and Davidson and the Rise of Constitution-Based
Standards of Care
Three years ago, in the companion cases of Daniels v. Williams99 and Davidson v. Cannon, 100 the Supreme Court finally introduced an order to this
universe. Both cases involved plaintiffs who had suffered injuries in prison,
Davidson in a prison brawl (of the type portrayed on late-night television
programs) 101 and Daniels in a classic slip-a~d-fal1 case (beloved by lawyers
who advertise on late-night television programs). 102 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Daniels, first refined his statement from Paul, carefully
stating that § 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of
that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right. " 103
Then the Court added the coup de grace for Whirl: "in any given section
1983 suit, the plaintiff must still prove a violation of the underlying constitutional right,· and depending on the right, merely negligent conduct may not be
·
enough to state a claim. "104
The Court then demonstrated its approach in a way that eliminated all
ambiguity: it first couched in constitutional terms its concerns about displacing state tort law; then it articulated the concerns that specifically underlie
the due process clause (reversing Parratt's unreasoned holding regarding negligence);105 and finally, it reinforced its point by holding that the prisoners'
claims were "remote from the [constitutional] concerns just discussed." 106
Justice Rehnquist closed by reiterating his opening idea:
That injuries inflicted by governmental negligence are not addressed by the
United States Constitution is not to say that they may not raise significant
legal concerns and lead to the creation of protectible legal interests. The
enactment of tort claim statutes, for example, reflects the view that injuries
caused by such negligence should generally be redressed. It is no reflection
tive due process cases); Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720, 724 (6th Cir. 1985) (same); O'Quinn
v. Manuel, 773 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); see generally Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 336-40 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (distinguishing between incorporated due process and
substantive due process as opposed to procedural due process).
98. See Mann v. City of Tuscan, 782 F.2d 790, 797-98 (9th Cir. 1986) (concurrence suggests
Parratt reverses Monroe's rule against exhaustion of state judicial remedies).
99. 474 u.s ..327 (1986).
100. 474 u.s. 344 (1986).
101. Id. at 345-46 (following threat from another inmate, reported to authorities, inmate attacked Davidson with fork).
102. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 (Daniels allegedly slipped on pillow negligently left on stairs and
fell).
103. Id. at 329-30 (emphasis added).
104. /d. (emphasis added).
105. /d. at 330-31.
106. Id. at 332.
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on either the breadth of the United States Constitution or the importance
of traditional tort law to say that they do not address the same. concerns. 107
Section 1983, of course, is nothing but a statute, and the underlying problem from Whirl to Daniels and Davidson has been the same: what does the
statute mean when it creates an action against an official who "subjects" a
person, or "causes [a person] to be subjected," to a "deprivation of any rights
... secured by the Constitution"? 108 There are surely enough words present
in the statute to justify whatever state-of-mind requirements the Court
wishes to find. Intellectually, t;here are at least three possibilities: Whirl's
incorporation of state tort norms, Daniels' reference to constitutional norms,
and the never-discussed option of finding norms in § 1983 itself.
The Whirl option lost support based on the Court's wariness about creating federal statutory law that would significantly overlap with state law, at
least state law concerning state officials. 109 But why not choose the second
option and use statutory law-§ 1983 itself-rather than constitutional law
as the source for the standards of care? Apparently, this option never occurred to members of the Court, probably because the statutory language on
its face refers to constitutionally created rights 110 and because the Court had
already solved related problems by adopting the view that § 1983 itself creates no substantive rights. 111 If the Justices had considered this option, they
would probably have rightly rejected it. A purely statutory approach to developing standards of care would have faced at best a dearth of sources in the
legislative history, 112 or at worst either a set of standards tied to long-dead
107. Id. at 333 (footnote omitted). Significantly, the dissenters in the companion cases did not
disagree with the majority's approach, only its result. Justice Brennan rejected mere negligence as a
constitutional standard of care, but would have covered official recklessness. Davidson, 474 U.S. at
349 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and Marshall agreed that the Constitution, not
common law, governed, although they thought that in the prison context some forms of negligence
might offend due process. /d. at 353-54 (Biackmun, J., dissenting and Marshall, J., joining).
108. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1982).
109. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332 (due process notions do not "supplant traditional tort law in
laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in society");
supra text accompanying notes 85-90 (describing Court's rejection of Whirl); cf. Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (fourteenth amendment not "a font of tort law to be superimposed'' on states).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) ("rights ... secured by the Constitution"); see Huffman v. Western
Nuclear, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2087, 2092 (1988) (statutory language is best indicator of what Congress
meant); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 420 (1968) (statutory interpretation begins
"with the language of the statute itself" in interpreting civil rights laws).
111. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
112. The legislative materials are admittedly vast and often explicit, but specific references to the
section that would become§ 1983 are few. See generally J. CooK & J. SOBIESKI, CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIONS 1-320 (1986) (collecting sources). Moreover, since§ 1983 was originally adopted as part
of a larger effort to suppress the Ku Klux Klan and guarantee rights for blacks, see id. §§ 1-318 to
-320, 1-333 to -335; Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97-102 (1971) (discussing background of
§ 1983's cohort, § 1985(3)); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961), the debates are directed
toward a more outrageous and topically limited set of issues than§ 1983 has come to cover. Under
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legislators who never foresaw the Constitution's growth or a set of standards
admittedly articulated as judge-made common law. 113 As nebulous and manipulable as constitutional law has become, it at least provides a coherent
basis for discussion.
The Court's new approach to defining standards of care for§ 1983-finding them not in the statute, but in the Constitution, and recognizing that they
vary with the constitutional right asserted-serves as an extraordinarily
strong organizing principle. In retrospect, it explains a great number of
cases, whether based on equal protection, incorporated rights, or general substantive due process, in which the Court never thought it relevant to explain
the basis for the constitutional claim at issue. 114 These cases demonstrate the
full richness and variety of standards that the Court has developed in the
name of constitutional law. 115 The Daniels approach leaves each intact for
use under § 1983.116

these circumstances the precise examples given in legislative discussion cannot properly give meaning to the general scheme. See Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1394
(1988) (discussing unanticipated consequences of evolving line of interpretation).
113. See supra note 57 (discussing commentators who argue for alternative readings of § 1988
that would import common law into§ 1983).
114. Professor Kirkpatrick's 1977 article concerning state-of-mind requirements presciently foresaw some of these issues. Written at a time when the qualified immunity defense still contained an
element of good faith, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 315 (1975) (official immunity standard
contains subjective element), rev'd, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), Kirkpatrick focused
much of his attention on the now-irrelevant net mental element applicable under§ 1983. See supra
note 75 and accompanying text (referring to standard of care imposed discounted by good-faith
immunity). He correctly predicted that the Supreme Court would find relevant state-of-mind requirements in the specific constitutional right sought to be enforced. Kirkpatrick, supra note 7, at
49. But his attempt to place each constitutional right into a predetermined category of torts, with
an appropriate mental element ranging from intent to strict liability, unfortunately redirected his
thesis toward tort law rather than constitutional law. See infra PART III (discussing uses and limitations of tort analysis in § 1983 cases).
115. They include: office searches under the fourth amendment, O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709, 725-26 (1987) ("reasonableness" if work-related); prison disturbances and the eighth amendment, Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) (intent to harm); procedural due process,
Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-31 (more than negligence, probably "deliberate decisions"); establishment
of religion, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-56 (1985) (purpose or primary effect of promoting
religion, or unnecessary entanglement between state and religious institutions); fourth amendment
claim of seizure by use of deadly force, Garner, 471 U.S. at 7-9 (probable cause and "reasonableness"; per se rule); due process liberty interest of pretrial detainees, Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S.
576, 584 (1984) ("intent" to punish); vagueness of statutes, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 35758 (1983) (statute unconstitutional if vaguely written; intent to harm through vagueness not discussed); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-79 (1979) (intent not to be measured by
reasonable foreseeability); prison medical care and the eighth amendment, Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 104 (1976) ("deliberate indifference" to serious medical needs); racial and sex-based discrimination, Village ofArlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-68 ("intent" to discriminate). The list is
illustrative rather than exhaustive.
116. As I shall make clear in Part III, the list in the preceding footnote is highly misleading
because it may leave the impression that all that is at issue here is compiling a list of state-of-mind
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CREATING THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: HOW AND WHY
SECTION 1983 AFFECTS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. A MISLEADING TRUISM AND TWO PATTERNS IN IDENTIFYING
STANDARDS OF CARE

1. The Truism that Section 1983 Lacks Content
Even prior to Daniels and Davidson the Supreme Court created a truism
that would make those decisions possible. In cases dealing with separate but
parallel issues, the Court repeatedly described both § 1983 and a closely related conspiracy statute as purely procedural vehicles having no substantive
content of their own. 117 It was this fundamental truism that opened the way
to reading Constitution-based standards of care into § 1983.
Yet the Court's newly recognized principle !)f referring to constitutional
law to identify standards of care for§ 1983 actions has one enormous initial
flaw: the Constitution contains not one single reference to such tort-like
standards of care. It is only partly facetious to say that the Court has discovered these standards in the same way that it generally discovers constitutional norms-it has made them up. What I propose to show here is that the
constitutional law created in this area substantially differs from traditional
constitutional law and that it is § 1983 itself that makes the law different. In
short, the fundamental truism noted above is quite misleading, for while
§ 1983 may in some technical sense possess no substantive content of its own,
it definitely colors the constitutional content that the Court pours back into
the statute.
The Supreme Court has accumulated a number of decisions that create
Constitution-based standards of care for§ 1983 actions. All share one striking feature: in them the Court uses tort concepts in defining constitutional
law. 118 The cases, however, follow two distinct patterns. One reflects the
need to charge juries in § 1983 actions and defines constitutional interests
requirements. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 7, at 50-70 (compiling such a list). It is equally important to identify constitutional duties against which the mental elements are measured.
117. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979) (in evaluating
scope of jurisdictional statute Court held that § 1983 does "not provide for any substantive rights"
but "'only gives a remedy'" (citations omitted)); Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny,
442 U.S. 366, 376 (1979) (holding that § 1985(3), a conspiracy statute having its source in same act
as § 1983, "creates no rights," but rather "is a purely remedial statute, providing a civil cause of
action when some otherwise defined federal right ... is breached" (emphasis in original)). The
approach was continued in the cases arising under the "and laws" language of§ 1983, Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-7 (1980) (section 1983 provides remedy for Social Security Act violation);
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981) (section
1983 provides no remedy for Federal Water Pollution Control Act violations); Wright v. City of
Roanoake Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 429 (1987) (section 1983 provides remedy for
violation of rights established in Housing Act of 1937). All of these cases consider§ 1983 to be a
remedial provision that finds its substantive content in other sources.
118. See generally supra note 115 (noting torts language employed in a variety of§ 1983 cases).
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with words and phrases taken directly from tort law. The other, reflecting
the dominant history of federal judicial control over constitutional law, relies
upon words and phrases taken from constitutional law, although apparently
altered to display tort-like behavior and to serve a tort-like role.
2. Standards that Adopt Phrases from Tort Law: The Individuation of
Constitutional Norms
The line of cases that uses tort phrases to define constitutional standards is
illustrated by a pair of prisoners' rights cases in which the plaintiffs claimed
rights under the eighth amendment. In Estelle v. Gamble, 119 perhaps the
earliest case to consider the independent creation of constitutional standards
of care, 120 an inmate argued that the prison doctors negligently cared for him
after a bale of cotton fell on him during a work detail. 121 He claimed that the
doctors' negligence violated his eighth amendment right, as applied to the
states through the fourteenth, to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.122 In rejecting a state-tort negligence standard for this claim, the
Court noted that any adopted standard must grow from the "Amendments
[invoked] and our decisions interpreting them." 123 There followed a discussion of such eighth amendment standards, developed in criminal cases, with
citations to the usual tests, "evolving standards of decency" and "wanton
infliction of pain." 124
Based on its review of these traditional tests, the Court created a constitutional standard to guide the provision of prison medical care. Only "deliber119. 429 u.s. 97 (1976).
120. More than three decades earlier, in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944), the plaintiff
claimed in a§ 1983 suit that Chicago-area election officials disobeyed state law in order to deprive
him of election to state office. /d. at 5. Since state-election claims not involving race were at that
time outside the protection of federal constitutional law, the Court construed the complaint as
presenting the bold claim that violation of state law by state officials also violates federal constitutional law. The Court rejected the claim out of hand. /d. at 11 ("Mere violation of a state statute
does not infringe the federal Constitution."). While that part of its decision has great relevance to
the issues to be discussed here and in Part III, the case came so far before post-Monroe development
of constitutional torts that its reasoning shows little indication of current approaches. It does show,
however, some early appreciation of the idea that a mental element-intent to discriminate-may
be used to distinguish federal from state concerns. Jd, at 10.
121. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 99.
122. /d. at 101-02.
.123. /d. at 102.
.
124. Id. at 102-06 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion) ("evolving standards of decency") and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion)
("unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain")). Virtually all of the cases upon which the Court
relied involved the death penalty or other court-imposed punishment. The Court turned to state
legislation and the common law to support its conclusion regarding provision of medical care to
prisoners, id. at 103 & n.8, 104 & n.9 (citing numerous state statutes as codifying common law and
other proposed minimum standards), as well as to a series of lower federal court decisions, id. at
104-05 & nn. 10-12 (citing opinions from seven circuit courts of appeals).
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ate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' ''I 25 held the Court; mere "inad·
vertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to ... offend
'evolving standards of decency' in violation of the Eighth Amendment."I 26
Estelle, therefore, remarkably resembles the great majority of cases that con·
stitute the body of eighth amendment jurisprudence, cases in which the
Court, in a particular context, defines what is constitutionally permissible
punishment. I27
Estelle differs from most eighth amendment cases, however, in that its rul·
ing seeks to do more than settle the very punishment issue before the
Courti 28 or refine the generic word tests of the law;I 29 rather, it creates a rule
that can be enforced by factfinders in the cases that follow. This development is matched in eighth amendment jurisprudence only by the radical pro·
cedural due process cases of the 1970s that require factfinders to carry out
the individuation of constitutional norms in death·penalty cases.t 30 In the
civil context this parallel individuation of constitutional law operates as tort
law, and it is not surprising to see the Court adopt a phrase from torts, "de·
liberate indifference," to reflect constitutional norms and allow juries to en·
force them.
Following Estelle, courts and commentators understood its standard to ap·
ply to all eighth amendment claims,IJI but the Supreme Court disabused
them of that notion in Whitley v. Albers, I32 a§ 1983 suit brought by a pris·
oner harmed by guards during the quelling of a prison disturbance. Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion cleverly distinguished Estelle on grounds famil·
iar to every constitutional lawyer: the earlier case rightly saw little state in·
terest in allowing inadequate medical care, but the "balancing [of] competing
125. Id. at 104 (citation omitted).
126. Id. at 105-06 (footnote omitted).
127. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-96 (1977) (plurality opinion) (death sentence for
rape grossly disproportionate to offense because outside consensual norms); supra note 124 (citing
eighth amendment cases).
128. See Louisiana ex rei. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1947) (second execution
attempt, following ineffective first attempt, not an eighth amendment violation).
129. See supra note 124 (citing eighth amendment cases).
130. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding system that
"focus[es] the jury's attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant"); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (mandatory death penalty for particular class of crimes unconstitutional); see
also Black, Due Process for Death, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 4-12 (1976) (discussing due process
problems in mandatory death penalty statutes).
131. See Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers, 751 F.2d 1448, 1452 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Estelle to prison suicide case); Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 162-63 (4th Cir. 1980) (protection of prisoners from sexual assault); see a/so S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION 69 (1st ed. 1979) (opining in early years following Estelle that its standard is applicable
generally to eighth amendment claims).
132. 475 u.s. 312 (1986).
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institutional concerns" would require a different result when restoration of
prison order was at stake. 133 The prison's interest in order was "undoubtedly" strong, non-rioting prisoners shared that interest, and the Court mentioned no cognizable riotous interests of the rioting prisoners. 134 In this
context, the Court held, the Estelle standard would have allowed too much
judicial second-guessing of prison personnel. 135
Given the balance of competing interests, the rights of inmates must be
defined at a lower level of judicial protection, said O'Connor, a level captured
by an alternate standard of care. To capture the constitutional idea of prohibiting wanton infliction of pain would require inquiry into " 'whether force
was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.' " 136 The
Court later described the state-of-mind showing in terms of intent, an "intent
to punish." 137
A variation on Whitley's standard has since been applied to a series of
other cases in which prisoners have claimed rights violations but the Court
has seen no rights, 138 thus confirming that there are at least two standards of
care that may apply to eighth amendment claims. Despite the different rule
created in Whitley, however, the rulemaking process employed in that case
closely resembles that used in Estelle in that the Court refers to traditional
constitutional norms for the amendment at issue and then proceeds to choose
a familiar phrase from tort law that factfinders can then apply to all future
situations in the genre. A tort-based phrase is chosen to individuate constitutional interests by focusing on the state of mind of the defendant governmental official. 139
3. Standards that Use Phrases Taken from Constitutional Law:
Individuation, Yet Also Institutionally Oriented Inqui!ies
The cases that adopt torts phrases contrast with a second, short line of
133. Jd. at 320.
134. Jd. at 320-21.
135. Jd. at 320. This theme continued with much greater force when Justice O'Connor applied
her proposed standard to the facts of the case. See id. at 1086-88 ("neither judge nor jury [may]
freely substitute their judgment for that of officials," and all plaintiff's evidence deemed unpersuasive of officials' states of mind).
136. ld. at 1085 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1033 (1973)).
137. Jd.; cf. id. at 320 ("wanton willingness").
138. See infra text accompanying notes 157-59.
139. For other examples of the use of tort-like phrases to identify state actors who behave unconstitutionally, see Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-31 (more than negligence, probably a "deliberate" decision); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 55-56 (purpose in establishment clause inquiry); Village of Arlington
Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-66 (intentional racial discrimination); Mount Healthy School Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-86 (1977) (intent to discharge employee for content of speech).
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decisions in which the Court has created constitutional tort standards of
care. In this second line the Court has captured constitutional ideas by
adopting familiar constitutional words and phrases. The best example of this
type is Tennessee v. Garner, 140 a § 1983 action brought by the parent of a
young man killed by a police officer exercising statutorily authorized discre~
tion to use deadly force against fleeing felons. 141 Justice White's majority
opinion began by asserting, without citation, that "there can be no question
that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure" within the meaning
of the fourth amendment. 142 Following the pattern of turning to constitu~
tionallaw to find § 1983 standards of care, the Court then focused its atten~
tion on traditional fourth amendment concerns.
The dominant concerns of fourth amendment jurisprudence, probable
cause and reasonableness, 143 led the Court to an extended discussion of the
"balancing" of individual and governmental interests and an inquiry into the
"totality of the circumstances," 144 in order to decide the constitutionality of
the shooting. Pointedly noting that the authorizing statute was not unconsti~
tutional on its face, 145 the Court set out its standard to guide future
factfinders: when the shooting officer has "probable cause to believe that the
suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to
others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using
deadly force." 146
While Garner's standard provides some individuation by calling for in~
quiry into the particular police officer's informational basis for inferring
probable cause, the very use of traditional constitutional law phrases raises
the specter that direct judicial balancing, rather than jury determination of
the defendant's state-of~mind, will determine the outcome of the case. The
Court has apparently suppressed this possibility in Garner itself by adding a
per se quality to the "reasonableness" inquiry: using ·deadly force against a
fleeing felon without the requisite probable cause is per se unreasonable. But
with such a strong tradition of judicial determination of probable cause, it is
quite possible that courts may intrude on the jury and determine that any
given quantum of evidence does or does not establish probable cause as a
matter oflaw. 147 Similarly, once the issue moves from use of deadly force to
140. 471 u.s. 1 (1985).
141. /d. at 4-5.
142. /d. at 7.
143. /d. at 7-8.
144. /d. at 8-11.
145. /d. at 11.
146. /d.
147. Cf. Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3040 (1987) (in context of defense assertion of
probable cause to search, Court creates procedures that seek to make issue resolvable by judge
rather than by jury); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986) (in defense context, Court creates
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use of excessive force, Garner's per se rule presumably collapses. 148 Will
courts that apply fourth amendment analysis to excessive force cases allow
juries to determine whether force was "reasonable" under the· circumstances?149 The individuation visible on the surface of such cases appears to
mask a traditional constitutional approach that can permit institutional balancing to overshadow determinations of individual culpability.
Garner's use of familiar constitutional phrases to create a standard of care
for § 1983 does not stand alone. The other cases, however, seem even less
individuated in their inquiries and more oriented toward testing the legitimacy of institutionalized concerns. In a series of prisoners' rights cases,
presenting claims that would receive strict scrutiny if brought against government by private citizens, the Court has developed a similar "reasonableness" test that also resembles and builds on low-level scrutiny. 150 Parts of
the Court's first amendment and takings clause case law also call for traditional constitutional law phrases to be read directly into the § 1983 case. 151
I should emphasize that these two patterns of creating constitutional standards represent tendencies and do not appear to be entirely distinct categories. This point can be illustrated by allusion to the cases that define rights of
pre-trial detainees. Since such persons have not yet been convicted, and may
never be, they have no rights under the eighth amendment. 152 The Court has
nevertheless recognized a general due process right to freedom from the infliction of punishment before conviction, a right that the Court in Bell v.
Wolfish 153 held to be implicated only when restrictions on such detainees
objective "reasonable police officer" against which judge may measure defendant's probable cause
to search).
148. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 14-15 (it is deadliness of force in context of crimes not punishable by
death that leads to per se rule of unreasonableness).
149. Cf. Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d. 706, 711 (7th Cir. 1987) (adopting Garner's reasonableness phrase for excessive force cases).
150. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2405-06 (1987) (free exercise of religion,
emphasizing no less-drastic-means test); Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2260-61 (1987) (no
heightened scrutiny of prison marriage and mailing regulations). For a discussion of traditional
low-level review, see Bennett, 'Mere' Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049 (1979).
151. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 & n.7 (1984) (emphasizing possible secular purpose as opposed to actual purpose, thus parallelling low-level scrutiny; rejecting less-drastic-means
test of high-level scrutiny); see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3147 &
n.3, 3150 (1987) (adopting "substantial relationship" test for measuring governmental regulations).
While Nollan was not a§ 1983 case, it presented a federal constitutional claim to state courts that
would have been equally cognizable as a§ 1983 case. See Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834
F.2d 1488, 1494-99 (9th Cir. 1987) (when special exhaustion requirements for takings claims have
been met, claim may be presented to federal court under§ 1983).
152. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664-71 (1977) (school child cannot use eighth
amendment to challenge excessive use of force in paddling because amendment applies only to
criminal punishments).
153. 441 u.s. 520 (1979).
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were so onerous as to be considered punishment. 154 In characterizing the
appropriate constitutional inquiry, the Court chose two countervailing tests,
one using a phrase from tort law-"intent to punish"-the other a phrase
adapted from constitutionallaw-"reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective."tss
Yet, if the two identified patterns are not entirely distinct, neither are they,
as the Court sometimes perceives, entirely fungible. Bell v. Wolfish again
demonstrates the point. The alternative inquiries proposed in that case are
not in fact opposite ways to ask the same question. Using the tort-based
"intent-to-punish" standard, for example, one might decide that a particular
administrator has created a particular apparently reasonable rule for no
other reason than to harm or beleaguer his charges, and therefore a factfinder would find a constitutional violation under§ 1983. Under the constitutionally influenced "reasonably related" test, however, the Court has often
made it a practice to ignore actually intended goals and to look instead at
hypothetical goals that decisionmakers might have had in mind. 156 Under
such an approach, acceptable goals and a reasonable relation between means
and goals would be found, as indeed they were in Bell itself.
These observations about differences in standards also demonstrate how
two cases that superficially appear similar are in fact quite different in focus.
The Whitley case, for example, tests for the presence of malicious motive by
permitting inquiry into its opposite-whether the prison official acted in
good faith for a "legitimate purpose" that the official reasonably perceived to
be present. 157 That standard appears similar to the standard later adopted in
another prisoners' rights case, Turner v. Safley, 158 in which the Court
adopted a test phrased as "reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest."159 While both use the "reasonableness" phrase of low-level equal
154. Id. at 535.
155. Id. at 538-39.
156. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7 (1981) (no inquiry
into actual motive behind distinction between milk containers unless court affirmatively persuaded
that proffered reason false); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)
("plausible reasons" supporting a distinction between treatment of two sets of retirees ends inquiry;
no actual-motive review); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949) (classic case in which Court demonstrates deferential review by hypothesizing reasons to support distinctions between types of advertising).
157. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. The Court stated the issue in terms of "whether force was
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm." Id. (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.)
(Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
158. 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
159. Id. at 2261; see also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2404 (1987) (similarly
phrased standard). Both cases involved restriction on prisoners-mail, marriage, and religious observance regulations-that probably would have been unconstitutional had they been applied to
ordinary citizens. See supra note 150 (noting standards applied in the two cases).
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protection, they have entirely different objects in mind: Whitley focuses on
the subjective intent of the individual officer exercising discretion, while Turner focuses on some impersonal governmental policy. In short, the Whitley
case exemplifies the tendency to individuate constitutional norms through
tort-like creations, while Turner exemplifies the process of adopting constitutional balancing concepts. It is not entirely satisfying, however, simply to
note that there exist two patterns of decisionmaking and deem the matter
closed. In the next part I try to identify what it is about § 1983 litigati<?n
that has led to these patterns.
B. ELEMENTS IN SECTION 1983 THAT AFFECT THE CREATION OF
STANDARDS OF CARE: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
IN THE PATTERNS
1. The "Dual Coverage" of Section 1983-0fficial Policy and Official
Misconduct
a. Monroe and the Two Patterns.
The tendency of the Court to use
two styles in creating constitutional standards of care--choosing tort phrases
to reflect deeper constitutional norms and adapting constitutional phrases to
reflect traditional constitutional norms-revivifies a long-standing schizophrenia in§ 1983 and constitutional torts. The statute dually covers constitutional challenges to official government policy 160 and constitutional
challenges to officers' acts that are in violation of official policy. 161 This dual
coverage formula, a significant factor affecting the creation of constitutional
standards of care, can be traced back to the original decision in Monroe. 162
The precise issue in Monroe was the proper construction § 1983's "under
color of" law language. 163 The defendants' construction would have held
160. Admittedly the phrase "official policy" has created substantial definitional problems in the
area of municipal liability under § 1983. See Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: ·
Some Lessons/rom Tort Law and Organization Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 1753, 1753-54 (1989) (discussing recent cases). My point has no specific relation to that discussion; I intend only to identify
decisions reached through authorized local legal processes, those decisions that represent the collective governmental judgment that is in constitutional decisionmaking balanced against individual
interests. I include judicial decisions from my post-Erie respect for state courts' power to decide
what is state law.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 20-29 (discussing Monroe's holding on this issue). One
might argue that there is a third relevant category, those acts that are not specifically authorized but
nevertheless fall within the officer's general authority. For purposes of the following discussion,
such cases are considered in common with those in which official policy is at issue. Cf. Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Com. Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 693 (1949) (acts within officer's authorized discretion are considered acts desired by government for purposes of sovereign immunity analysis). The
categories as framed here have no necessary correlation with similar phrases used to determine
municipal liability.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 20-25 (discussing facts of Monroe).
163. This issue itself replicated in statutory form the same issue that the Court faced about fifty
years earlier in interpreting the state action doctrine of the fourteenth amendment. See Home Tel.
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official action to be under color of law only if it had been taken in accordance
or compliance with state law, 164 thus possibly requiring exhaustion of state
judicial remedies before initiation of the § 1983 suit. 165 The Court rejected
the argument and instead held that action occurred under color of law even
when taken in violation of state law. Power conferred by state law creates
color oflaw, said the Court, and the federal§ 1983 remedy is supplementary
to any state-created remedy for state-created rights. 166 Thus, § 1983 could
be used to attack both official policy that violates the fourteenth amendment
and officers' acts in violation of official policy, provided their acts also contravene the fourteenth amendment.
It would be easy at this stage to hypothesize a direct correlation between
the two topics covered by Monroe and the two patterns followed by the
Supreme Court in creating constitutional torts: tort-like phrases would appear in cases involving official misconduct, while Constitution-based phrases
would be found in official policy cases. There is a bit of evidence to support
the proposition, for in Estelle and Whitley, in which tort phrases were used,
the Court seemed to see the defendants as engaged in ad hoc decisionmaking
rather than in following some prescribed legislative policy. 167 In the Garner
case, on the other hand, in which official state policy was at issue, the Court
used Constitution-based language to create the standard of care. 168 The later
prisoners' rights cases show an even more pronounced orientation toward
impersonal inquiry into state policy, 169 the Court displaying virtually no appreciation of the possibility that a warden might be acting outside the parameters of official policy. But psychoanalysis of the Justices is a dangerous
game, and the precedents are simply too few to reach the conclusion that
standards of care correlate with whether official policy is or is not at issue.
It is, moreover, unlikely that any such correlation should be developed.
Section 1983 must apply nationwide, both in jurisdictions in which the proposed constitutional standard has been adopted and in others in which incon& Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 289-94 (1913) (city's action need not be approved
by state courts in order to be state action).
164. 365 U.S. at 172.
165. See id. at 183 (rejecting argument because Congress intended§ 1983 to be used without first
exhausting state judicial remedies). But see id. at 245-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (adoption of
defense position should not lead to exhaustion requirement; federal courts should consider whether
defendant's actions are consistent with state law). See generally Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla.,
457 U.S. 496, 502-07 (1982) (discussing background and policy implications of exhaustion in considering administrative exhaustion).
166. 365 U.S. at 183.
167. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing Court's holdings in Estelle and Whitley).
168. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text (discussing Garner's constitutional standard
of care language).
169. See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text (distinguishing prisoners' rights cases employing individual officer state-of-mind analysis from those employing official policy analysis).
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sistent local rules will become unconstitutional. 170 In short, § 1983 may be
the vehicle for challenging activity that is official misconduct in one locality
and unconstitutional official policy in another. Any given standard of carewhether phrased in terms familiar to torts or those familiar to constitutional
law-must be capable of application in both contexts.
Although it is probably undesirable to make such a logical correlation, one
can reach a more basic conclusion: the coverage under§ 1983 of defendants
who violate state policy has substantially altered the previous thrust of constitutional decisionmaking. It has done this by introducing more individuation into constitutional rules than was previously present.

b. The New Patterns and the Old Structured Constitutional Law.
Prior to Monroe, the predominant method of constitutional analysis balanced
private rights against state interests as expressed in legislation (or through
some other broadly legitimated decisionmaking process, such as commonlaw judicial edicts). 171 The two most used methods of constitutional litigation tended to ensure that cases were presented as final resolvable issues that
implicated such state authority. The first method, Supreme Court appellate
review of a constitutional issue arising in state court, virtually guaranteed
that only official policy could be attacked, if for no other reason than that the
state court has approved the state official's position. 172 The second method,
170. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 15-19 (shoot-to-kill rule followed in some states, not in others).
171. See L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 1-17 (discussing various "models" of constitutional adjudication, all of which tum on consideration of individual and institutionalized state). In a brief closing discussion of the problem discussed in this Article, Tribe sidesteps the major intellectual
problem: first he says that constitutional coverage of an official's ultra vires acts must not be "overstated," but then he seems to find it easy to cover virtually all such situations by simply noting that
"possession of state power" is adequate to convert the officer into "the state." I d. at 1703-05.
172. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 239-40 (1824) (reversing state law and
"policy" granting steamboat monopoly on interstate waters enforced by state court injunction);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,425-36 (1819) (reversing state policy of assessing
tax on federal bank notes and state courts' enforcement of policy); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 352-61 (1816) (state court's holding announced state policy; Supreme Court's
previous holding that such policy conflicted with federal treaty reiterated in classic cases justifying
Supreme Court's power to overturn state judicial decrees that enforce unconstitutional state policy).
In later cases that presented fourteenth amendment issues, the same format for constitutional litigation predominated prior to Monroe. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1948) (reversing state covenant-enforcing law as employed by state courts to set policy permitting segregation of
neighborhoods); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-10 (1946) (reversing state law and judicial
enforcement of statute precluding exercise of first amendment right to distribute religious leaflets in
company town); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) (reversing state courts' enforcement of
city ordinances restricting leafletting in violation of free speech rights); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 58-64 (1905) (reversing state legislative policy, enforced by state courts, of limiting bakers'
hours). Although the foregoing list presents cases in which state policies were reversed, state policy
also is the focus of Supreme Court decisions when state judgments are upheld on appellate review.
See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277-81 (1928) (upholding state law, enforced by state court,
permitting destruction of trees allegedly without adequate compensation).
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constitutional challenge via a federal bill in equity, 173 also structured litigation so as to produce attacks on state policy. 174
173. See Collins, "Economic Rights," Implied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope of Section
1983, 77 GEo. L.J. 1493, 1494-95 (1989) (federal question statute was "preferred vehicle" for con·
stitutional challenges against state); Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability,
37 CAs. W. RES. L. REV. 396, 448-49 (1987) (discussing implied federal rights actions brought
under federal question statutes); cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 484-91 (1955) (even
after integration of law and equi.ty, case sought injunctive relief against constitutional wrongs with·
out reference to § 1983). The best-known federal equity case is Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), in which railroad stockholders sought to enjoin the enforcement of allegedly unconstitu·
tional state-mandated rate schedules. The defendant state attorney general was concededly acting
pursuant to state statute. Id. at 137-38.
Young is widely remembered because of the supposed illogical "fiction" it inaugurated. C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 289 (4th ed. 1983). Read together with Home Telephone, 227 U.S. at
287-89 (official action in violation of state law is state action), Young's reasoning has been criticized
as inconsistently holding that action qualifying as "state action for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment [is] but merely [an] individual wrong ... for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment."
C. WRIGHT, supra, at 289-90. Tribe tries to deal with the problem tautologically by arguing that an
official may act beyond the scope of state law "without thereby forfeiting his state office," L. TRIBE,
supra note 18, at 1703, an argument that presumably shows that the officer remains a fourteenth
amendment state actor under such circumstances. Tribe appears erroneously to"assume that mere
office-holding is sufficient to find state action, a view at odds with the law. See Polk County v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320-22 (1981) (state-paid public defender not state actor). More fundamen·
tally, however, he misses the most critical intellectual issue: how can a decisionmaking process that
balances governmental and individual interests work when the governmental interest is that of a
misbehaving individual officer?
174. See Collins, supra note 173, at 1494-95. These cases followed a format in which plaintiffs
alleged that a state official enforced an unconstitutional state Jaw (i.e., that he conformed to state
law), that because the state law was unconstitutional it could not be deemed true state policy, and
that therefore ·the official would be required to answer personally for invasion of the plaintiff's
rights. I d. at 1510-11. It is not altogether clear why these cases invariably attacked state statutes or
official policy,-for the format would appear to work equally well when the official also violated state
policy. In Home Telephone, the Court had specifically rejected the idea that illegality of an act
under a state's constitution ousted the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear federal constitutional
claims, 227 U.S. at 282-96, so presumably the restriction of federal equity attacks to state statutes
and policies was not dictated by jurisdictional considerations. The Court also expressly noted in
Home Telephone that the fourteenth amendment extends to "state officers abusing the[ir] powers,"
even when the officers may "deny the power" given them under state law. I d. at 288; cf. C. ABER·
NATHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL RIGHTS 10 (1980) (asserting that Home Telephone and
Monroe address the same issue, the former on constitutional grounds and the latter in its interpreta·
tion of§ 1983). Although the assertion of illegality under state law arose in Home Telephone, as in
Monroe, at the behest of defendants seeking to dismiss as opposed to a plaintiff actually seeking to
enforce a combined claim of federal- and state-law illegality, the Court's ruling in Siler v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 190-93 (1909) (joined claims may proceed even if federal qestion
ultimately not decided), rendered the factor immaterial.
Perhaps the reason for the practice has simpler, but cumulatively more substantial, explanations.
First, perhaps there was a broad (even if erroneous) assumption in the legal profession that federal
courts were to hear constitutional claims against state officials enforcing state law, while state courts
were to hear claims of violation of state law. See Isseks, Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts to
Enjoin Unauthorized Action of State Officials, 40 HARV. L. REV. 969, 969 & n.2 (1927) (docu·
menting confusion among lower courts regarding their power to enjoin acts violative of state law).
Second, perhaps the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, Pacific Live Stock Co. v.
Lewis, 241 U.S. 440, 451-55 (1916), would have particularly applied to allegations of illegality
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Against this backdrop, the constitutional decisionmaking process was understandably dominated by consideration of official state policy rather than
officers' misconduct. 175 The constitutional law that grew from this process
was highly structured and asked institutionally oriented questions. 176 Within
that structure, however, per se rules are anathema. 177 Every case presents at
least the possibility of a different result if some new more "substantial governmental interest" 178 is at stake or some more appropriate means is used. 179
As this grand structure was building, § 1983 was invoking a procedure
that would accentuate a different style of constitutional lawmaking. Specifically, Monroe's interpretation of§ 1983 as authorizing suits against officials
under state law. Finally, and perhaps most important, even when some claims attacking abuse of
state power slipped through to the Court, they were simply overwhelmed in numbers by the vast
majority of cases in which the Supreme Court wanted to 'make law in the early twentieth century,
cases in which legislatures by official policy chose to regulate labor and welfare. See STONE &
SEIDMAN, supra note 13, at 724-50 (discussing old substantive due process cases). By the time the
Court turned its attention to non-economic rights and began to create a body of constitutional law
binding on state and local discretionary officials, see Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 319-20 (1957) (noting slow buildup of
due process protections), Monroe was standing in the wings to make moot the issue of covering
misconduct.
175. Even among those few § 1983 cases that were brought prior to Monroe, most involved attacks on official policy because Home Telephone's constitutional construction of state action had not
been extended as a matter of statutory construction to § 1983. Cf. Collins, supra note 173, at 14991500 (until the 1960s, Court did not construe§ 1983's "under color of" state law requirement to
include acts by state officials that violated state law). For an example, see Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268, 269-72 (1939) (attack on state voting law).
Although the reasoning in Home Telephone appeared to cover errant state officers, the actual
defendant was a city that had set policy through its usual policy-setting organs. See Home Telephone, 227 U.S. at 278-80 (attack on ordinance); cf. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 350 (1879)
(common-law judge violated state law by practicing racial discrimination in juror selection); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 314-16 (1879) (same). The few constitutional cases that involved
official misbehavior are largely limited to criminal prosecutions in which it could be said that state
policy rather than misbehavior was at issue because state courts had ratified convictions. See Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 357-63 (1886) (conviction under discriminatorily administered ordinance); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 371-73 (1880) (discrimination in juror selection for criminal prosecution). The cases, therefore, stand for little beyond the reasoning that the state judicial
policymakers also are covered by the fourteenth amendment. See Rives, 100 U.S. at 346-47 (state
acts through legislative, executive, and judicial authority).
176. See STONE & SEIDMAN, supra note 13, at 495-543 (discussing high-level and low-level scrutiny under equal protection analysis); id. at 610-65 (discussing middle-level scrutiny).
177. See City of Richmond v. Croson, 109 S. Ct. 706, 717 (1989) (no per se rules for evaluating
race-based affirmative action programs); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (no per se rule
against legislation stigmatizing black persons, rejecting concurrence favoring such a rule). Outside
the area of individual rights, see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137-38 (1986) (no per se rule, under •
dormant commerce clause, against statute discriminating against out-of-state products-baitfish).
178. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12, 320 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.) (minority representation in school is substantial state interest); Lee v. Washington, 390
U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (segregation of prisoners during racial riot might be
substanti!il state interest).
179. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 351-52, 360 (1972) (striking down state residency law
for voting; shorter residency period would be satisfactory means to effectuate state's interest).
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acting in violation of state law necessarily altered the constitutional lawmaking process. If§ 1983 could be used to enforce constitutional rights against
officers who specifically do not represent the governmental interest, how
could the structured system's constitutional balancing of interests occur?
One-half of the equation would be missing, or to put it very basically, perhaps the state's interest when an official violates state law is not the same as
or as strong as its interest when plaintiffs attack its laws and policies, if for no
other reason than that the collective judgment of the citizens is not behind
the erring defendant official.tso
Some decisions, especially earlier ones, solved this problem by simply assuming, without great reflection, that the state actor represents the state's
interest.l 81 One view might characterize the resulting process as adjudication of hypothetical claims, with the hypothesis that the state supports the
state-law violator, but that view would raise certain justiciability problems
for the federal courts that were to hear these cases. 182 Another view would
recharacterize the scene in terms of responsibility: a state may not empower
an official and then protect him from personal federal liability (or itself from
injunctive liability) for the harms caused when he uses that power. 183
Monroe itself appears to have adopted a somewhat different position-that
power exercised in the name of the state and made possible by general authority conferred by the state is action by the state. 184 But to recognize the
force of the holding is only to restate the constitutional problem: how does
the constitutional law balancing process work when one looks behind the
180. Cf Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969) (inequality in
representation in voting vitiates usual presumption of constitutionality because full collective judgment of approval has not been won); United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938) (lack of representation in legislative process may lead to denial of presumption of validity for
resulting legislation); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 7-8, 87-88 (1980) (proposing representation-reinforcing model of constitutional law on thesis that broadly represented decisions deserve
deference).
181. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 170-71 (assuming that usual constitutional rules apply in case in
which official misconduct alleged); id. at 192-202 (Harlan, J., concurring) (constitutional violations
present same underlying problem regardless of whether official violated state law); id. at 208-11
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (constitutional analysis condemnatory regardless of whether official
misconduct present); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108 (1945) (assuming that beating of
suspect presents same due process problem regardless of whether authorized by state law).
182. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-60 (1911) (barring judicial review of hypothetical questions seeking advisory opinion).
183. See L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 1704 (except for limited areas such as procedural due pro• cess, clothing official with state authority is adequate to create constitutional responsibility). Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 280-83 (1980) (holding that state may erect defenses denying official
liability), is not inconsistent with this argument because the state-law defenses upheld in that case
limited a state-created, rather than constitution-based, right. See Felder, 108 S. Ct. at 2308-14 (state
may not enforce state-law created defenses that materially undercut constitutional liability of state
officers).
184. 365 U.S. at 184; see Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 346-47 (state is conception that may act
only through real persons).
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assumption that a state actor represents the collective will and sees only a
lone gunman with a badge?
This intellectual conundrum partially explains why the Court is drawn
toward using tort concepts when it creates standards of care for constitutional torts. First, tort phrases are highly individuated because they focus on
the state-of-mind of the actor; 185 thus they may. be easily adapted to fit the
Monroe-type circumstance in which there may be no articulated institutional
interest, only an eccentric individual defense interest. Second, tort standards
are derived from a balancing process at common law that traditionally measured the interests of two competing private citizens, 186 a situation replicated
under § 1983 when the official defendant acts in contravention of the collective will as expressed in state law.
This is not to say that the constitutional standard only balances private
interests; rather, because the constitutional-tort phrase is stated in terms of
tortious mental elements, thus requiring no further balancing, it can be applied easily to circumstances in which the defendant represents no state interest. The tort-based "test" works well in § 1983 cases, therefore, because it is
equally manageable regardless of whether the defendant has violated or followed state law. 187 Any interest that the state might have had was factored
in when the appropriate tort phrase was initially chosen. 188
The intellectual conundrum created by dual coverage also may explain
why the Court has in the last fifteen years been attracted toward intent as the
predominant mental element for reflecting constitutional norms. 189 Prior to
the adoption of constitutional tort analysis in Monroe, the intent test had a
very checkered history in constitutional decisionmaking, 190 but the availability of§ 1983 actions to attack official misconduct soon brought new respect
185. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 6 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. It is possible that the state-of-mind element will apply
to the plaintiff as well, as in contributory negligence or self-defense. This occasionally occurs in the
creation of constitutional norms. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974) (per
curiam) (intent of speaker to communicate is key ingredient in symbolic speech claim); see also infra
Part II.B.l.c (discussing cases in which "definitional balancing" has been used). But see Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558 (1967) (inviting arrest does not vitiate constitutional claim).
186. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 185, at 5-6.
187. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (adopting deliberate indifference standard for failure to provide
prison medical care).
188. See id. at 108 (considering state interest in developing tort-based standard); Whitley, 415
U.S. at 320-21 (1986) (explaining Estelle's balancing of interests); supra text accompanying notes
161-69 (discussing Estelle and Whitley).
189. See supra note 115 (listing mental elements adopted in various cases).
190. See supra notes 3S-39 (discussing cases adopting and rejecting intent inquiries); see generally
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 19 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). In
the first few years after Monroe, the Court occasionally continued to express the view that motive
was irrelevant in constitutional analysis, see United States v. ·o'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)
(congressional motivation irrelevant in first amendment case), but such cases soon fell from grace,
see infra notes 195-96 (citing later cases in which motive considered relevant).
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for the intent standard. 191 Quite simply, its attractiveness lies in the fact that
it is more workable than the traditional balancing approaches in the context
of action that violates state policy. Traditional constitutional law focuses on
ends and means, with the means test often serving only as a proxy inquiry
into prohibited ends. 192 In the context of constitutional review of legislative
action, such a means test avoids the political difficulty of labeling a legislative
action ill-motivated. But when no policy is at issue and only an individual
defendant accused of violating state law is present, there is no such etiquette
problem, and motive may be tested directly.
Yet the intent test created some new problems even as it ameliorated older
ones. In order to make the intent test work, the Court needed to identify
precisely· those ends that are constitutionally forbidden. 193 This the Court
has done. 194 To the extent that this new thinking raised the specter of facing
down legislative motives, the Court also has taken some steps to reduce potential conflict. It not only has limited discovery into legislators' motives, 19 5
it has more importantly created a mixed-motive defense that is especially
helpful to legislative bodies. 196 To combat the argument that motive is diffi191. See Village ofArlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-68 (intentional discrimination violates racial-discrimination ban of fourteenth amendment); Doyle, 429 U.S. at 283-84 (intent is relevant in
case of alleged discharge for exercise of first amendment rights).
192. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 695 (1977) (unreasonableness of
means indicates proffered end not actually at stake in use of contraceptives); Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) (irrationality of means in protecting instate apple consumers fuels concern that intentional discrimination against out-of-state products
may be at issue); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(legislature's choice of means reveals its true ends); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64 (lack of close connection between limited bakers' hours and health of bakers shows state law not intended as health or
labor law).
193. Cf. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 185, at 46 (distinguishing between object intended in
battery-"to inflict physical injury"-and the object intended in assault-"to arouse
apprehension").
194. Two examples are instructive. When the Court adopted the intent test for race-based equal
protection claims, in the Arlington Heights case, it soon faced an attempt to read intent as it is
sometimes read in torts, as a foreseeability test. See Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 140-43 (2d
Cir. 1978) (adopting foreseeability test); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 564 F.2d 162, 168
(5th Cir. 1977) (same). The Court decisively rejected that approach and instead tied intent to the
intent to bring about certain desired, but constitutionally prohibited, ends. See Personnel Adm'r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-79 (1979) (inquiring whether statute benefiting veterans-most
of whom are men-actually passed to exclude women from benefits). Similarly, in the prison discipline arena, which spans several constitutional rights, the Court has adopted a variant of the intent
test, one that focuses directly on whether the state actor's end was to carry out permissible ends
(imposition of order and discipline) or prohibited ends (the imposition of harm for the mere goal of
punishment). See Whitley, 415 U.S. at 320-21 (rejecting dispute as to efficacy of prison guard's
actions and requiring showing of intent to harm); Bell, 441 U.S. at 536-37 (1979) (inquiring whether
pretrial detention served permissible state goals).
195. Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 269 & n.18.
196. See Doyle, 429 U.S. at 285-86 (school board that fired teacher for protected speech may
escape liability by showing that constitutionally permissible purpose alternatively motivated its de-
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cult to discern, the Court has reintroduced into constitutional law the concept of "good faith," now as an antagonistic measure of constitutionally
permissible ends.I97
The Court may also be responding to the dual coverage problem, albeit
apparently unwittingly, in its rulings on municipal liability. Under Monell v.
Department of Social Services 198 municipalities and other local government
units have joined real persons as potential defendants under § 1983, liable
not automatically under respondeat superior, but only when the decisions of
high ranking officials "may fairly be said to represent official policy." 199 · For
purposes of ruling on whether an officer's acts may be ascribed to the municipality, Justice White and others have ruled that the Court should use a variation of the very Brer Rabbit test that was rejected in Monroe in the context of
finding individual responsibility: officials acting in violation of local law cannot be said to be acting pursuant to such law, he reasoned, and therefore the
municipality cannot be held liable in such circumstances. 200 This reasoning
responds to the dual-coverage conundrum in a very elegant functional manner because of the way in which successful plaintiffs would seek to enforce
their judgments. When an officer acted in violation of local law, he would
bear individual responsibility, but when obeying local law he would effectively escape liability. 201 Yet, this remains a limited development, restricted
to local government units. 202
Even if no direct correlation can be made between Monroe's dual coverage
and the two patterns used in developing standards of care, one fundamental
cision); cf. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (same defense generally available to state
guilty of racial discrimination, but fails on facts).
197. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21 ("good faith" used as synonym for permissible motive).
198. 436 u.s. 658 (1978).
199. /d. at 694.
200. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 486 (1986) (White, J., concurring). The precise question was whether an Ohio county could be held liable for a search authorized by th'e
County Prosecutor. White agreed that it could, reasoning that the attorney possessed policy-making power to authorize searches and that no state constitutional, statutory, or local laws expressed
the government's policy that such unlawful searches were forbidden. /d. at 1301-02. The apparent
purpose of White's position was to encourage municipalities to draft effective rights-protecting regulations by holding out the prospect that the regulations would insulate the muncipality from liability.
Justice O'Connor concurred in Justice White's reasoning in Pembaur, id. at 1304, and later authored the plurality opinion in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. 915 (1988), which sounded
similar themes. See id. at 924-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (scope of authority to make policy to
be determined by reference to state law as construed by state courts).
201. Since liability under § 1983 is ordinarily joint and severable, cf. Dobson v. Camden, 725
F.2d 1003, 1004 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane) (assuming joint liability), and since judgments could be
satisfied most easily by collecting in one step from the municipality's deep pocket, a judgment
against both an officer and municipality would effectively run against the latter alone.
202. Monell applies only to local government units, not to state-level entities which retain sovereign immunity. See Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Auth., 440 U.S. 391,400-01
(1979) (setting out standards for distinguishing between local and state-level government bodies).
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observation remains valid. The condensation of two problems-state-sanctioned unconstitutional conduct and unconstitutional officer conduct violative of state law-under one statute, § 1983, has led to certain conceptual
problems that are more easily solved when courts phrase their constitutional
inquiries in terms of state of mind, at least state-of-mind tests that clearly
delineate the ends forbidden by the Constitution. 203 This style of constitutional rulemaking may look odd when compared to the dominant structured
decisionmaking process of the 1960s and early 1970s. But that is precisely
the point: § 1983's coverage of state actors' state-law misconduct has
changed the dynamics of constitutional law and produced a different style of
constitutional rule.

c. The New Patterns and "Definitional Balancing. "
Although the
Court's creation of state-of-mind requirements under§ 1983 has led to a constitutional law quite different from the structural constitutional law popularized in the 1960s and 1970s, these new approaches have direct historical
antecedents in first amendment law, particularly the rules that Nimmer calls
the product of "definitional balancing. " 204 In the area of free-speech analysis
where a state's interest may be related to the content of speech, the Court has
created a series.of tests that depart from the predominant balancing model
not by eschewing balancing altogether, but by choosing a test that describes
the product of appropriately balanced interests. Such tests then become "a
rule ... [that] can be employed in future cases."20s
Such definitional balancing thus eliminates the need to return to overt balancing of governmental and individual interests in every future case; instead
the appropriate test is applied to the facts at issue, indicating a preferred
result. 206 While Nimmer has praised the "actual malice" standard of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 207 the same approach can be seen in several other
cases. 208 The balancing of interests done to arrive at the appropriate test is
203. The state-of-mind requirement must be tied to a constitutionally specified duty, a forbidden
end, in order to achieve the goal of creating a standard of care for § 1983. See infra Part III.
204. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory applied to Libel
and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 passim (1968).
205. Id. at 944.
206. For an interesting overview of definitional balancing and its chief competitors, "ad hoc
balancing" (similar to what I have called merely balancing) and "absolutism," see G. GUNTHER,
supra note 18, at 983-85, 1056-57.
207. 376 u.s. 254 (1964).
208. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31 (1973) (for obscenity, multi-part test including
"appeals to the prurient interest"); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (for
subversive advocacy, speech "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action is likely to"
do so); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963) (in hostile audience situations, "incitement"); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) (for inflammatory speech, speech surpasses
bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes "incitement to riot"), I cannot contend that
these cases are of exactly the same mold as the§ 1983 cases, for their tests focus more on asserters
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remarkably similar to that undertaken in some of the § 1983 cases discussed
above. 209
Although a direct cause-and-effect relation between substance and procedure is difficult to establish, it is at least possible to say that a procedural
dynamic similar to § 1983 was at work in the definitional balancing cases.
Although there was an early movement to restrict review to legislative decisions,210 the Court later rejected that approach and developed an active jurisprudence that justified its inquiry into the constitutionally relevant facts of
each case. 211 Perhaps more important than the Supreme Court's own practice were the related procedures that it encouraged for lower courts, those
that entailed considering cases on their individualized facts rather than entertaining so-called "facial" or "overbreadth" attacks. 212 These procedural dynamics thus permitted the Court in free-speech cases to peer more closely
into individual circumstances instead of dealing only with institutionalized
concerns appearing on the face of official policy.
The recognition of this similar approach in free-speech law allows us to see
the tort influence on § 1983 in somewhat starker relief, espeCially the
Monroe-based development of constitutional norms that can be applied to
officers acting in violation of state law. As we have seen, in the definitional
balancing cases the Court has created rather black-letter rules that are, like
those created for§ 1983, susceptible to application in circumstances in which
the state official has violated state law. Yet, in several areas of free-speech
jurisprudence, the Court has independently required that the state official be
acting pursuant to a specific ordinance or statute and failure to act pursuant
to legislative directive is deemed to be an independent first amendment violation.213 No similar practice can be found in§ 1983 cases,2 14 in which courts
of rights (section 1983 plaintiffs) than on officials (section 1983 defendants)-the opposite of
§ 1983's focus. But like the§ 1983 cases, these cases adopt tort-like state-of-mind tests rather than
undertake ad hoc balancing of interests in each new case.
209. Compare New York Times, 376 U.S. at 254 (individual's free speech interest in criticizing
state officials affords privilege in libel suit absent malice) with Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21 (prison
guards given great deference in quelling prison riot in absence of showing of malice).
210. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668-70 (1925) (Court will defer to legislative determination that certain speech involves danger); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 367, 371-72
(1927) (actual danger presented by speech is unreviewable question of fact, not a constitutional
question).
211. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 898 (1982) (reversing damage
award after review of facts underlying liability for boycott); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161
(1974) (Rehnquist, J.) (reversing obscenity conviction after independent review of facts); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545 & n.8 (1965) (reversing breach of peace conviction after undertaking
"our independent examination of the record, which we are required to make").
212. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973) (limiting overbreadth attacks and
expressing aversion to facial attacks); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 272-73 (1941) (attacking
contempt power as applied to speech).
213. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 25 (statute clearly defining speech is prerequisite for obscenity conviction); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951) (licensing statute must contain standards to
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are more likely to follow the maxim that an errant official's violation of state
law, while not defeating § 1983 liability,215 certainly raises only state-law issues that do not amount to a constitutional violation. 216 Perhaps one can
explain this discrepancy by noting that the demand for statutory authorization is properly limited to free-speech cases because of our traditional fear of
censorship. 217 Or perhaps the Court should face the fact that its practice of
choosing tort phrases to reflect constitutional norms masks the deeper problem previously noted-that its development of standards for § 1983 has so
far ignored the fact that no state interest is present to be constitutionally
balanced when an officer violates state law.21s
2. The Problem of Charging the Jury: Who Finds Constitutional Facts?

Monroe v. Pape not only provided a Constitution-based claim for official
conduct violative of state law, it also provided a federal forum for the
claim. 21 9 And along with the federal forum goes the right to a jury triaJ.2 20
This created a new magnitude of problem for constitutional decisionmaking-how to integrate jury decisionmaking into the traditional judge-domiguide administrator); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940) (narrowly drawn statute
necessary to sustain breach of peace conviction when speech at issue; common law breach of peace
prosecution inadequate); cf. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (state court may supply
standards through statutory interpretation).
214. In Whitley, for example, the Court defined the constitutional wrong after balancing interests, see supra text accompanying note 133, labeling a government interest in restoring order as
weighty and the prisoner's interest in resisting restoration of order very slight. 475 U.S. at 320-21.
Yet, the balancing might have yielded quite different results if the state had itself forbidden use of
force. In that case, the officer's interest would not have been a "state" interest, but only an eccentric individual interest.
215. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 167, 183-84 (action in violation of state law is nevertheless state
action).
216. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 ·(1944) (violation of state law not itself a constitutional violation); cf. Paul, 424 U.S. at 693, 710 (state law tort does not become constitutional violation when done by state official).
217. Cf. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (because of censorship possibilities, due
process value of notice strictly applied when speech at issue); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51,
60-61 (1965) (setting out elaborate safeguards that statute must incorporate to avoid potential for
censorship). Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953), which limits "as applied" attacks on
licensing schemes, id. at 408-11, governs only the timing of constitutional attack, and does not
negate the command that the standards must be present to guide administrators.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 180-202 (discussing the difficulties created by dual coverage aspect of§ 1983 as announced in Monroe).
219. See C. ABERNATHY, supra note 174, at 10 (noting fact of federal court jurisdiction over
§ 1983 cases).
220. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974) Gury trial rights
apply in civil rights suits, particularly Fair Housing Act cases); Harkless v. Sweeney lndep. School
Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1970) (same rules regarding jury trials apply to§ 1983 suits). The
parties may, of course, relinquish their rights to jury trial, but the possibility of such a trial requires
that courts adopt standards that will be useful when a jury is employed as factfinder.
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nated process of protecting constitutional rights. 221 Prior to Monroe, federal
judges realized that factfinding power played a large role in protecting federal constitutional rights, but their feared principal competitors in factfinding
were state judges and jurors. 222 The mask of federalism concerns was tom
free after Monroe, forcing federal judges to decide how they could allow any
other persons, even federal jurors, to share in constitutional adjudication.
Choosing tort phrases to reflect .cc;mstitutional norms-which would then
be used to charge the jury-appeared to solve parts of the problem, or so
judges might have thought. The traditional view is that tort phrases present
a body of well-established tests that produce somewhat predictable results, at
least at the margins of jury decisionmaking. 223 In Estelle, for example, the
Court could adopt the "deliberate indifference" standard with certainty that
it would produce fewer verdicts for plaintiffs and consequently less federal
interference with the state's prison medical operations than would a negligence test. 224 Psychologically, moreover, the chosen test would permit federal jurors to involve federal courts only when they were subjectively highly
outraged by the prisoner's suffering, 225 paralleling the Court's determination
that the eighth amendment forbids only wanton or heinous infliction of
harm. 226 Similarly, ascertaining a defendant's motive or intent is a traditional kind of inquiry that juries have managed to undertake both in civil and
criminallaw. 227 At least the direction of juries to a single fact makes their
job more manageable.
Jury-charging norms made from constitutional-law words and phrases
cannot claim this same apparent traditional manageability. These phrases
lack a history of workability with juries-they are judges' talk. More fundamentally, however, the vocabulary of constitutional law has acquired a subtlety and nuance, a flexibility, that is designed to give some leeway to the
federal judge playing her Marbury v. Madison role. "Probable cause," the
constitutional phrase read directly into § 1983 in Garner, 228 is a good exam221. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704-05 (1974) (Supreme Court is ultimate arbiter
of the Constitution); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) (Court may
declare laws unconstitutional).
222. See supra note 211 and accompanying text (citing cases in which Court inquires into facts of
case to determine constitutionality of the defendant's activity). The solution developed in those
appellate jurisdiction cases could not be carried over to§ 1983 because of the seventh amendment.
223. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 185, at 26-28 (discussing importance of determining
defendant's motive in establishing liability).
224. See supra text accompanying note 125 (discussing Estelle standard).
225. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 185, at 9-15, 21-23 (moral considerations affect liability
and damages, with higher standard such as deliberate disregard adopted to test for greater moral
outrage).
226. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
227. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 185, at 26-28 (discussing role of state-of-mind
requirements).
228. 471 U.S. at 11.

1480

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 77:1441

pie. As much as the Court attempted in the Warren era to refine the meaning of the phrase,229 it remains flexible and acquires some precision only
when employed by a judicial officer who has himself accumulated experience
in balancing police needs against the privacy interests of citizens. 230
This theme-that constitutional law is inherently judicial law-is especially evident in the number of constitutional tests that purport to inquire
into the "totality of the circumstances" or otherwise overtly balance interests.231 It should not be surprising, therefore, that multi-factor charges to
the jury, such as were once fashionable in excessive force cases, tend to present recurring problems. 232 The law applied in most circuits to excessive force
cases came from an early Second Circuit case, Johnson v. Glick, 233 and required the balancing of at least four separate factors. 234 While such an approach might provide guiding standards for judges, who could look at the
accretion of case-law determinations on specific facts, juries would be left
standardless. Indeed, Johnson's demise has ceased to be the relevant issue;
the question now is whether the Justices can create an alternative that allows
any role for jurors. 235
1

A full listing of constitutional tests that would make jury instructions
229. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114-15 (1964) (anonymous tip from unverified source
cannot provide probable cause).
230. This observation is proved primarily by developments in the law of qualified immunity, in
which the Court has developed an "objective reasonableness test" that courts would apply to dismiss claims prior to trial. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986) (adopting standard used
by judges in ruling on suppression motions); cf. Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271, 1275 (7th Cir.
1988) (en bane) (question of constitutional violation vel non is for judge acting under a guise of
ruling on what a "reasonable jury" could determine).
231. See, e.g., Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 804 (7th Cir. 1988) (en bane) ("objective.reasonableness under the circumstances" is test for probable cause in use of force for arrest); Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) (rejecting structured test, adopting "totality-of-the-circumstances"
test for tip-related probable cause determinations).
232. See Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 383 (4th Cir. 1987) (circuit court noted multi-part test
and clarified mental element in a manner that allowed jury to focus on three different possibilities);
Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 1987) (excessive-force cases dealing with
arrest incidents treated under more objective fourth amendment standards in which mental elements irrelevant).
233. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
234. Id. at 1033. The court listed the relevant factors:
In determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court must look to such
factors as [I] the need for the application of force, [2] the relationship between the need
and the amount of force that was used, [3] the extent of the injury inflicted, and [4]
whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.
Id. (emphasis and numerals added). The court noted, however, that decisions also must be made
with an awareness that constitutional standards must steer very clear of merely replicating state-tort
standards. Id.
235. See Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989) (rejecting Johnson, but adopting another balancing test).
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problematic runs the risk of reductio ad absurdum. Think of a jury instruction on state action taken from Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority 236 or
imagine directing a jury to decide whether saving a fetal life in a particular
abortion case is a "compelling state interest." 237 Traditional constitutional
law phrases are inadequate bases for instructing a jury precisely because they
have no meaning when shorn from the judges who are purposely given leeway by the tests.
Three solutions might be suggested, and the Court has tried them all.
First, the Court might define with more particularity its constitutional tests
so as to make them more suita.ble for jury implementati9n. This is arguably
what the Court did in Garner when it defined the scope of "reasonableness"
as a constitutional matter-deadly use of force without probable cause to
fear danger to officer or community is per se unreasonable238-so as to leave
a much narrower issue for the jury. While this represents an improvement in
manageability that may ultimately prove itself, it also creates a new and extensive list of problems similar to those previously faced in ordinary torts'
nebulous field of negligence: when should certain conduct become a tort per
se?239

The second solution would be for the Court to retain some kind of veto
power over jury decisions by converting triable issues into legal issues. The
Court also has experimented with this approach, substituting its judgment
for that of the primary factfinders, and ruling as a matter of law that certain
evidence either possesses or lacks the requisite power to meet the prescribed
constitutional test. 240 This approach clarifies the primary legal standard and
provides fodder for further instructions that could presumably confine a
236. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). The Court's test required "sifting facts and weighing circumstances,"
id. at 722, and contemplated a case-by-case accretion oflaw. While some of these are now in place,
it seems that substantial balancing-judicial discretion-still necessarily plays a role. See Gilmore
v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 568-69 (1974) (struggling to apply refined test that aid beyond "generalized services" that has a "significant tendency" to promote discrimination could lead
to finding of state involvement).
237. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) (such test applies to abortion decisions). If it
is thought that this is a truly legal question that could never conceivably go to the jury, consider a
more likely factual candidate-whether regulations have a "significant impact" on any given person's exercise of the right. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462
U.S. 416, 434 (1983) (state regulation of abortion procedure places significant burden on exercise of
right to abortion); cf Memorial Hasp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 258-59 (1974) (only
"penalties" on exercise of fundamental right to travel receive strict scrutiny).
238. 474 U.S. at 11-12.
239. Cf PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 185, at 227 ("negligence per se" is akin to strict liability and consists of doing what is forbidden by statutory rule).
240. See Whitley, 415 U.S. at 322-26 (extensively reviewing testimony and explaining why it is
inadequate); supra notes 230-31 (citing cases in which Court retained veto power over factual
determinations).
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factfinder in future cases, 241 ~hus producing quite typical traditional issues
concerning what amounts to a tort "as a matter of law." 242 This provides a
judicially manageable way of solving the problem of reconciling juries'
factfinding with the courts' duty to protect constitutional rights.
The third attempt to solve the problem of sharing power over constitutional torts is more problematical. Under the guise of altering the qualified
immunity doctrine, the Court has endeavored to create a pre-merits issue
that would be legal only. Thus, the doctrine protects officials from monetary
liability in those circumstances in which constitutional law is unsettled 243
and there is little doubt that what constitutes. settled law is itself a question of
law. 244 Since fourth amendment law is as settled as it is likely to get, 245 one
might have expected that all cases in this area would go to a jury on the
"merits." Thus, the probable cause issue in Garner would be assumed to be
appropriate for ajury. 246 Instead the Court in Malley 247 converted that issue
into one for the judge by measuring the real defendant's evidence and knowledge against a mythical reasonable police officer in the circumstances. 248 The
workability of this solution is in doubt. 249
As difficult as it might be to convert constitutional words and phrases into
jury-triable standards of care for§ 1983 actions, let me introduce a word of
skepticism about the alternative, choosing torts phrases to serve the same
goals. Even if juries do not in fact understand torts talk, judges understand
the impact of such phrases on juries at the margin of decisionmaking. 250 I
have tried to capture this idea by repeatedly referring to the use of such
phrases to "reflect" constitutional norms. But it should also be recognized
that these reflections produce a derivative and thus less certain version of
241. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 323-25 (not open to plaintiffs to present witnesses who will secondguess prison authorities on the need to restore order or best methods for it).
242. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 185, at 236-38 (explaining scope of power of court to
rule "as a matter of law" in negligence cases).
243. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
244. This is because the question necessarily involves the question of what the Jaw is or was. See
Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3038-40 (discussing meaning of phrase "clearly established" constitutional
law).
245. See id. at 3039 (principles of fourth amendment settled).
246. See supra text accompanying note 146 (quoting Garner's constitutional standard).
247. 475 u.s. 335 (1986).
248. Id. at 343-44.
249. In Anderson the Court adhered to its Malley decision, but it appeared to admit that Malley's
attempt to decide the issues by motions to dismiss or for summary judgment-thus avoiding any
appearance of jury-like factfinding-could not always work. See Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3040 (decision can be made only by knowing information available to defendant); id. at 3042 n.6 (discovery of
facts may be necessary to make ruling). Of course, to the extent that factfinding is necessary, that
development complicates the easy argument that this is purely a question of law and reduces the
Court to holding that this is an issue of law only because the Court says so.
250. See supra text accompanying note 223 (arguing that tort phrases give more predictable
results).
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constitutional adjudication than does judicial decisionmaking that directly
invokes the constitutional norms. 251 The subtlety of constitutional lawmaking that open-ended constitutional norms now give to judges would be lost;
there could be no steady course of decisions under a jury-enforced reflective
test that could send a signal stronger than the underlying constitutional rules
themselves. Worse still, the constitutional-law interest in having life-tenured
judges protect minority rights would be diminished as decisionmaking under
only reflective guidelines is handed to juries. Finally, there is the real fear
that tort standards provide only the illusion of greater manageability with
juries. In other constitutional contexts where they have been employed, some
think that tort phrases "roll right past the jurors." 252
III. FROM STATE-OF-MIND TO STANDARDS OF CARE FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS-THE LIMITS OF TORTS TALK AND
THE RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. THE PROBLEM OF THE DISEMBODIED STATE-OF-MIND REQUIREMENT
For better or for worse, § 1983's creation of constitutional torts has
changed constitutional interpretation. The inherent tension in covering both
conduct illegal under state law and that consistent with state law, when
joined with the need to charge juries in civil actions, has created problems
affecting the very constitutional law that will be enforced in the § 1983 action. The primary effect, as discussed in the preceding section, has been the
creation of tort-like standards of care or the adaptation of constitutional tests
to resemble tort-like standards. This development has, however, created another problem: some courts, fascinated with state-of-mind phrases, have unfortunately viewed them as a panacea for some difficult issues, thus ducking
the issue of prescribing the requisite objects of the state-of-mind, the duties
imposed by constitutional law. These courts stop at a state-of-mind requirement when they should be fashioning a standard of care.
251. Consider the parallel criticism that several commentators have directed at "categorical"
decisionmaking in free-speech cases. They charge that the use of such categories as "fighting
words," "commercial speech," and "child pornography" to exclude certain speech from ordinary
constitutional protection is but a gross version of balancing that should probably be discarded in
favor of more precise balancing in each case. See generally Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of
Obscenity, 1960 SUP. Cr. REv. 1 (categorization versus balancing in obscenity analysis); Schauer,
Codifying the First Amendment, 1982 SuP. Cr. REV. 285 (categorization examined through analysis
of Supreme Court's categorization of child pornography as unprotected speech); Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981) (preference for
categorical distinctions in first amendment analysis ignores theoretically significant differences but
provides framework for incorporating free speech values into legal system).
252. See Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 613 (1983) (commenting on "reckless
disregard" standard read into constitutional law of libel).
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The probl~m appears in several contexts. Most are related to liability for
indirect harms, those not personally inflicted by government officials but
originating elsewhere and not restrained by government. In Dollar, 253 for
example, the parents of children killed by a natural flood sought to hold a
county liable for failure to build a bridge that would have carried them above
the waters. In Jackson v. City of Joliet 254 and Archie v. City of Racine 255
estates sought to hold cities liable for the consequences of accidents or natural health problems in contexts in which city aid seemed appropriate. 256 In
Wood v. Ostrander 257 a person harmed by a third party after government
officials failed to render aid sought to impose liability on the officials. 258 In
Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers 259 an estate sought to hold officials
responsible for the decedent's self-inflicted death. 260 A quite similar issue has
arisen in some municipal liability cases in which plaintiffs seek to impose
liability on government for the inadequacies of its personnel. In McKenna v.
City of Memphis, 261 for exampler the plaintiff sought to hold the city liable
for its employees' constitutional violations by alleging that the city had inadequately trained and supervised them.262
In several of these cases, as well as others presenting similar problems,263
courts appear to have chosen the quite similar "gross negligence, recklessness, or 'deliberate indifference'" tests264 as their state-of-mind requirements,
and have turned the cases back to juries on these "[t]riable issues of fact." 265
To the extent that these cases emphasize a state-of-mind requirement standing alone, and allow juries to decide without further guidance, their holdings
253. 704 F.2d at 1540. For a fuller discussion of Dollar, see supra text accompanying notes 8182.
254. 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
255. 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) (en bane).
256. In Jackson, the police officer at the scene of an accident failed to ascertain whether a burning car was occupied before directing traffic from the area, thus preventing passersby from rendering aid. 715 F.2d at 1201-02. In Archie, the city provided emergency medical services via telephone
that proved to be inadequate and misleading to the affected person; she died. 847 F.2d at 1213-14.
257. 851 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1988).
258. I d. at 13 (woman raped by man who gave her ride after police officer arrested her companion, had his car impounded, and left her on foot in high crime area).
259. 791 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1986).
260. Id. at 1183.
261. 785 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1986).
262. ld. at 561.
263. See, e.g., Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1246 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) ("gross
negligence"); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 793 (11th Cir. 1987) (en bane) ("grossly negligent"
or "deliberately indifferent"); Vinson v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 820 F.2d 194, 199-200 (6th
Cir. 1987) ("gross negligence"); Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1986)
(gross negligence); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1979) ("gross negligence" or
"reckless disregard").
264. Wood, 851 F.2d at 1214.
265. Id. at 1219.
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are inadequate. They are the same as saying that "intent" violates the equal
protection clause, without fully noting that it is "intent to segregate based on
race" that comprises the full constitutional standard of care. If this is an
outright mistake, it was not a mistake made by these courts alone.
B. THE FAILURE OF DANIELS AND DAVIDSON

The Supreme Court faced similar sets of facts two years ago when it first
overtly adopted its current approach of finding § 1983 standards of care in
constitutional rather than common law norms. In the companion cases of
Daniels v. Williams 266 and Davidson v. Cannon 267 the Court decided that
neither the procedural nor substantive due process aspects of the fourteenth
amendment made negligent official conduct actionable under § 1983. Taking
a bold stand, the Court declared "that the Due Process Clause . . . is not
implicated by the lack of due care" 268 because "something more than negligence"269 is required. In defining what that something more was, the Court
hinted that only "deliberate decisions" give rise to a constitutional claim. 270
There may be a good deal to recommend the Court's intuitive judgment
that due process concerns were not implicated in the cases before it, a slipand-fall claim in Daniels, someone having left a pillow in the inmate's walking path, and a beating by fellow prisoners in Davidson. 271 But the Court's
method of decision, letting a state-of-mind phrase carry the total burden of
distinguishing constitutional wrongs, has nothing to recommend it. State-ofmind tests are meaningless and manipulable without an articulation of the
duties that the law imposes.
That state-of-mind phrases alone could not serve the Court's goals should
have been apparent to the Court based on observations it made in both cases.
In Daniels the prisoner contended that a prior case involving loss of goodtime credits without a hearing had implicitly recognized that negligent failure to provide hearings is a procedural due process violation. The Court
responded that the "relevant action of the prison officials in that situation is
their deliberate decision to deprive the inmate of good-time credit, not their
hypothetically negligent failure" to provide a hearing about the loss. 272 That
266. 474 u.s. 327 (1986).
267. 474 u.s. 344 (1986).
268. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334.
269. I d. The Court attributed this remark to the plaintiff, but acknowledged in text and footnote
that it did not quarrel with the view and would not rule on the precise issue it raised. See id. at 33435 & n.3 (discounting plaintiff's argument that it would be difficult to determine precise standard if
it is "something more than negligence").
270. See id. at 331 (noting that, historically, due process implicated only by such decisions); id. at
333-34 (giving example of deliberate decision leading to liability).
271. See supra notes 101-02 (summarizing facts of cases).
272. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 333-34.
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statement is almost flatly at odds with the Court's holding in Carey v.
Piphus, 273 which emphasized that the constitutional interest deserving of
compensation in procedural due process cases is primarily the interest in a
hearing, not the rightness of the hearing's outcome. The plaintiff, therefore,
appears to have focused on the correct constitutional interest. 274 Moreover,
by changing the focus of the duty from the hearing to the good-time loss, the
Court demonstrated that state-of-mind tests are easily manipulated unless
they are tied to a particular duty. 275
The decision in Davidson illustrates the same flaw. Although it rejected the
plaintiff's claim concerning failure to protect him from fellow prisoners, the
Court cited with approval two cases which had imposed liability. In the first,
guards themselves had unnecessarily beaten an inmate, 276 and in the other,
guards stood by while prisoners beat a fellow inmate. 277 There is no way to
distinguish the latter of these two cases from Davidson on state-of-mind
alone. The Court must also articulate the constitutionally imposed duty,
possibly one to protect from harm prisoners in one's presence, but not prisoners outside one's presence. The dissenting opinion in Davidson faced this
issue; 278 the majority did not. 279
The Court's failure in Daniels and Davidson to explore the range of constitutional duties contrasts sharply with the Court's earlier opinion in Estelle, ·in
which articulation of a duty to provide care for "serious medical needs" provides the focus for choosing the "deliberate indifference" standard. 280 Shorn
of a specific duty, deliberate indifference might be interpreted to release from
liability a prison doctor who through mere inattentiveness-indeliberate indifference, not a "deliberate decision" to ignore his inmate patients-played
more golf than he practiced medicine. But Estelle's specification of a duty,
the affirmative duty to provide care for serious medical needs, provides a
focus for the state-of-mind inquiry. The same could be said for several other
well-reasoned Supreme Court decisions. 2 B1
273. 435 u.s. 247 (1978).
274. /d. at 266.
275. See supra notes 185-97 and accompanying text (discussing same issue with respect to ordinary torts and Court's intent cases).
276. Davidson, 414 U.S. at 348 (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). Johnson and its importance are discussed above. See supra notes 233-35 and
accompanying text.
277. Davidson, 414 U.S. at 348 (citing Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974)).
278. /d. at 350 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between dangers from which a prisoner
could protect himself, such as a fall, and dangers from which only prison personnel could protect
him, such as a fellow inmate's attack).
279. /d. at 348 (majority opinion) (simply observing that as in slip-and-fall case only "lack of due
care" was at issue in beating case).
280. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 94, 104 (1976).
281. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987) (intent unneces·
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There are some arguments that could be made for a disembodied state-ofmind requirement for due-process violations, even assuming that by "deliberate decision" the Daniels Court meant to cover decisions made with "deliberate indifference" or "recklessness." 2 82 Most importantly, it would provide
omnibus coverage, protecting all citizens from every kind of highly objectionable mistreatment by state officials. But that virtue is also a vice. The test
could produce a potential claim in every citizen for every supposed harm, an
approach at odds with the traditional approach of imposing greater duties
upon governmental officials only in the context of a limited number of highly
protected fundamental rights. 283
There are other arguments that also could be made for the practice, but
their defects show the limitations inherent in letting tort phrases carry too
much of the load of defining constitutional rights. First, the open-ended test
might be conceived as a protection against arbitrariness, a recognition that
current due-process doctrine prevents such governmental action. 2 84 Yet that
protection has been created in the context of judicially declared constitutional law in which judges appraise action with the substantial deference
mandated by low-level scrutiny. 285 To allow juries to make the arbitrariness
decision, which they could do if courts did not restrict them by specifying
constitutional duties, would tum our constitutional law on its head. 286 Finally, it might be argued that this disembodied state-of-mind test would provide at least some protection against those excesses that failed some smell test
and most upset society. However, this could lead not only to regional variations of the type lamented under the old Whirl approach to § 1983,287 but
also to jury-to-jury variations depending on the sympathies of the parties and
the values of the jurors. 288 Only some articulation of constitution-based dusary in free-speech case involving tax on magazines when it can be shown that tax varies by content
of publications); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 579-80 (1984) (intent to punish pretrial detainee, rather than intent to promote safety).
282. Ct Wood, 851 F.2d at 1214 (construing Daniels to permit adoption of deliberate indifference
or recklessness standard).
283. See Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870-71 (1989) (rejecting "generic" due process).
284. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331.
285. See, e.g., Kelley v_,_Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248-49 (1976) (hair length); Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (employment restrictions); ct Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (since practicing homosexual sodomy is not fundamental right,
regulation of the activity does not receive close scrutiny).
286. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (life-tenured judges usually protect rights from
majority pressure).
287. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55 (discussing problems inherent in adopting state
common law standards for § 1983 cases).
288. Whatever may be said for Justice Rehnquist's observation that "many branches of the law
abound in nice distinctions," Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334, the distinction between intent and gross
negligence or "deliberate decisions" may be simply too psychologically crude to form the basis for
constitutional law that jurors will apply. See Archie, 847 F.2d, at 1226 (en bane) (Posner, J., concurring) (doubtful of term's precision without articulation of duties).
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ties can avoid these problems.
C. THE TENTATIVE 1989 DECISIONS

The Court returned to these issues in early 1989 and attempted to put
some meat on the disembodied state-of-mind requirements that appeared to
dominate the Daniels and Davidson cases. The two cases, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services 289 and City of Canton v. Harris290 struck superficially discordant tones, DeShaney . emphasizing
constitutional duties, while Canton continued to use torts phrases. 291
Although the cases cannot easily be reconciled, several similarities in the decisions indicate that the Court is finally beginning to appreciate that identification of constitutional duties is even more important than manufacturing
state-of-mind requirements.
The DeShaney case involved a child beaten so severely by his father that he
was left brain-damaged for life, but the§ 1983 suit was brought not against
the father but against county social workers who "fail[ed] to intervene to
protect" the child. 292 The Court rejected the case on grounds that spoke
pointedly in terms of constitutional duties. The fourteenth amendment, said
the Court, "forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or
property without 'due process of law,' but its language cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those
interests do not come to harm through other means. " 293 Although the Court
acknowledged that it had created exceptions for persons held involuntarily in
state custody, 294 it found these inapplicable because the child was in the custody of his father. 295 Finally, sounding a long-standing theme, the Court
pointedly noted that its decision was based on constitutionally supplied
norms, not those relevant to the creation of state tort law. 296
289. 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
290. 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989).
291. A third case, Brower v. Inyo County, 109 S. Ct. 1378 (1989), is also of some importance.
See infra note 309 and accompanying text (discussing Brower).
292. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002. Over a period of two years the county social services agency
intervened to protect the child on one occasion, but provided only sporadic follow-up supervision
despite repeated documented evidence suggesting that the father repeated abused the child. Id. at
1001-02.
293. Id. at 1003. The Court also noted that there is "no affirmative right to governmental aid,"
id. (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (failure to provide funding for abortions
not constitutional violation), and that as general matter, a "State is under no constitutional duty to
provide substantive services," id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982)) (services
must be provided to involuntarily admitted mental patients, but not generally to others).
294. 109 S. Ct. at 1005 (discussing cases involving prisoners and mental patients); cf. White v.
Rockford, 592 F.2d 381, 384 n.6 (7th Cir. 1976) (special relationship created when officers arrest
child's custodian and leave child unattended).
295. 109 S. Ct. at 1005-06.
296. Id. at 1006-07.
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The Canton case seems similar, for it involved the alleged failure of city
officials to provide adequate training to their police officers, training that
would forestall harm visited upon detainees by untrained officers. Never citing DeShaney, the Court ruled that liability could be imposed on the city if
its inaction "amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with
whom the police come into contact." 297 On its face the opinion appears not
only to resort once again to disembodied state-of-mind requirements to identify constitutional norms, it also imposes affirmative duties in violation of
DeShaney's admonition that officials are liable only for their own misdeeds.
There are ways to distinguish DeShaney and Canton, but they satisfy only
as well as fast food. Canton, one could argue, was a municipal liability case
in which the Court appeared to understand that some officer had already
committed a constitutional violation, and the sole remaining issue was who
would pay. 298 DeShaney, the argument goes, involved no extant violation
since the offending father failed to qualify as a state actor. 299 But the argument puts untenable pressure on the state-action distinction, for officers, even
supervisors, are no more liable for the actions of fellow officers than they are
for those of private persons. 300 A variant of this argument might emphasize
that Canton concerns municipal, not personal liability, but that thesis runs
afoul of the observation that the law of municipal immunity has grown directly from the law of supervisors' liability. 301 A final mutation might press
the position that municipal liability appears to depend on statutory, rather
than constitutional, ascription of responsibility, 302 but that argument fails to
note that the same language covers all "person[s]," both real ones and
municipalities. 303
297. 109 S. Ct. 1197.
298. See id. at 4272 (seeking "causal link between a municipal policy or custom, and the alleged
constitutional deprivation"). Professor Schuck makes this assumption in his article on municipal
liability that appears in this symposium. See generally Schuck, supra note 160.
299. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (private person performing activity
unconstitutional when done by public official does not become state actor when he acts as permitted
by state law).
300. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (supervisors not liable on respondeat superior
theory for unconstitutional actions of underlings).
301. Compare id. at 375-76 (no respondeat-superior-type liability for supervisors; causal link between supervisor's acts and underling's wrongs must be shown) (Rehnquist, J.) with City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818-20 (1985) (plurality opinion ofRehnquist, 1.) (rejecting
respondeat superior liability for municipalities and demanding "affirmative link") and id. at 828
(Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.) (requiring similar linkage). See
generally Canton, 109 S. Ct. at 1203-04 (summarizing municipal liability rules).
302. See Canton, 109 S. Ct. at 1203-05 & n.8 (no constitutional violation by city supervisors, only
by line officer (citing City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 267 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (tying liability to statutory responsibility for "caus[ing]" constitutional deprivation))).
303. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 688-89 (municipalities are "persons" under§ 1983); cf. Malley, 475
U.S. at 344 n.7 (ruling that causation, in context of individual responsibility and intervening events,
is measured by statutory and common-law, rather than constitutional, norms).
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Although the Canton opinion appears dazed and confused at this intellectual level, the rules actually announced in the case are a significant advancement over the Court's earlier efforts in the Daniels and Davidson cases, for
the Court carefully delineates the duties to which it ties the "deliberate indifference" mental element. Indeed, the state-of-mind phrase seems virtually
irrelevant: the Court maintains that the pertinent "issue ... is whether th[e]
training program is adequate," 304 and proceeds to define quite narrowly the
considerations that apply in making that determination. First, the Court
adopts an obviousness test, imposing a duty to train when "the need for more
or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in
the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can
reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. " 305 Second, the Court reinforces the program-level responsibility of city officials,
opining that there is no duty to see that each officer is adequately trained. 306
Finally, the Court protects the municipality from speculative claims by requiring that plaintiffs demonstrate that an identifiable failure to train "actually caused" or is "closely related" to the harm suffered.307
Canton, therefore, is a far cry from prior cases that adopted a disembodied
state-of-mind requirement: rather, it specifies the duties that a city policymaker must observe in order to avoid liability. To the extent that the
DeShaney case also defines the perimeters of constitutional responsibility, 308
it likewise contributes to the accretion of a law of constitutional duties that
serves the traditional purposes of constitutional law by having the Court,
rather than juries acting pursuant to vague mental elements, define constitutionallaw.309
304. 109 S. Ct. at 1205.
305. I d. The Court illustrated the idea in a footnote that states that failure to train police officers
in the use of their firearms would be an obvious factor leading to violations of the rule of Gamer.
Id. at 1205 n.10. The Court also adopted the view that a series of constitutional violations could
put the city on notice that its training efforts were deficient, toleration of which would constitute a
violation of§ 1983. Id.
306. 109 S. Ct. at 1206.
307. Id.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 294-95 (distinguishing between custodial and non-custo- dial situations). In light of Davidson's holding that a jailor has no duty to protect from beatings
prisoners who are outside his presence, see supra text accompanying notes 276-79, it appears that
DeShaney's line will need further refinement.
309.· In Brower, another related case decided in early 1989, the Court adopted an intent test for
testing fourth amendment seizures. 109 S. Ct. at 1381 ("termination of movement through means
intentionally applied" is a seizure; unintended restriction is not (emphasis in original)). Brower thus
continues the trend of specifying constitutional standards of care not by adopting state-of-mind tests
alone, by by specifying with some care the duty owed by the state actor. To the extent that the
Court left open on remand the definition of constitutional unreasonableness, Brower also shows that
the definition of constitutional duties may depend upon laying of several specified duties. Jd. at
4323 (seizure found; demands of "reasonableness" under Garner open on remand).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In a marked clarification of its ruling in Monroe, the Supreme Court has
recently held that§ 1983 has no state-of-mind requirement of its own, that it
adopts the state-of-mind requirement of the constitutional right that the
plaintiff seeks to enforce. This development not only rationalizes the law of
§ 1983, it also reiterates the long-established distinction between constitutional law and state common law. To the extent that this may make it more
difficult for plaintiffs to induce federal courts to judicial activism, it is a difficulty grounded in a real appreciation for constitutional norms.
Yet the movement to find§ 1983's standards in constitutional norms tends
to obscure a subtler reality, that the very existence of§ 1983's authorization
of suits for damages alters the ensuing constitutional law that the Court
makes. Assumptions about § 1983 that date back to its original reinvigoration, particularly its dual coverage of both official acts and official misconduct as well as its reliance on juries for enforcement of damage claims, create
dynamic influences that force constitutional law more in the direction of a
torts-like vocabulary and method of analysis. I have argued that movement
can be reconciled with constitutional tradition only if courts end their overreliance on disembodied state-of-mind requirements and begin to identify the
more precise constitutional duties to which the mental elements attach.
The fluid ideas identified in this Article are more currents than stagnant
pools. The movement toward constitutionalizing standards of care contains
an eddy that seeks to have some issues of causation turn on statutory rather
than constitutional norms. Even more fundamentally, the rise of municipal
liability is undermining Monroe's original model of individual responsibility
and perhaps giving some impetus to a competing model of governmental responsibility, at least for the training of personnel. Grounded in constitutional concerns, § 1983 has shown itself to be as changeable as the
constitutional law it enforces.

